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NOTES
TAKING BATSON ONE GIANT STEP
FURTHER: THE COURT PROHIBITS
GENDER-BASED PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES IN J.E.B. V.
ALABAMA EX REL. T.B.
The United States Constitution grants to every criminal defendant ac-
cused of serious crimes the right to a jury trial, and preserves for every
civil litigant the right to a jury trial where it existed at common law.1 The
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id. The Supreme Court has held that the right to trial by jury applies to the states as well
as the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968). There is no right to a jury trial for petty
offenses. Id. at 159-61. The general rule is that the right to a jury trial exists where the
maximum authorized incarceration period for the crime exceeds six months. Blanton v.
City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 539-42 (1989) (holding that a maximum penalty of
six months in jail, $1,000 fine, loss of a driver's license for ninety days, and an alcohol abuse
education course, did not mandate the right to a jury trial for a charge of driving under the
influence of alcohol); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (holding that a maxi-
mum penalty of one-year in prison triggers the right to a jury trial). If the maximum au-
thorized penalty for a crime is six months or less, there is a presumption that no right to
jury trial attaches. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543-44. If a defendant is facing more than one
charge, the maximum penalty for each charge is aggregated to determine if the defendant
maintains the right to a jury trial. United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 87-90 (4th Cir.
1991) (holding that the right to jury trial exists where the aggregate of maximum sentences
for assault exceeds six months, although the actual sentence imposed was less than six
months). Where the maximum prison term exceeds six months, however, a court can re-
move the right to jury trial through a pretrial commitment not to impose a sentence of
more than six months. United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1991).
In the absence of a maximum prison term greater than six months, a defendant is enti-
tled to a jury trial only if the other penalties imposed indicate that the offense is one that
the legislature has determined to be serious. Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202, 1204-05
(8th Cir. 1990) (imposing the right to jury trial despite the fact that the jail sentence im-
posed was less than six months, where the mandatory penalty for a third conviction for
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jury selection process is a complex mechanism designed to ensure that
those selected will be fair and impartial decision-makers. 2 The process
begins with calling members of the community to serve on the jury ve-
driving while intoxicated was a 15-year driver's license revocation). In determining
whether monetary fines alone can trigger the right to a jury trial, courts focus on whether
the level of potential fines is likely to have a serious impact on the defendant. Compare
United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 665 (2d Cir. 1989) (pro-
viding that an organization has a right to a jury trial where a fine for criminal contempt
exceeds $100,000), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990) with United States v. Hamdan, 552
F.2d 276, 279-80 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (holding that an individual defendant has a
right to a jury trial whenever the fine exceeds $500). There is no constitutional right to a
jury trial in juvenile cases. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-47 (1971) (holding
that the policy considerations underlying the juvenile justice system militate against the
entirely adversarial proceedings implicit in a jury trial).
In contrast to the right to a jury trial, there is no corresponding right to a non-jury trial.
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-36 (1965) (finding that a defendant's constitutional
rights are not violated by conditioning a waiver of the right to jury trial on the consent of
the prosecution and trial judge); United States v. Parker, 742 F.2d 127, 128 n.1 (4th Cir.)
(contending that the defendants had no right to a non-jury trial for a perjury charge where
the judge, who presided at the trial where the alleged perjury occurred, insisted on a jury
trial for impartiality), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076 (1984).
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution preserves the right to a jury
trial where it existed in civil suits at common law. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. In Jacob v.
City of New York, 315 U.S. 752 (1942), the Supreme Court asserted that "[tihe right of jury
trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and fundamental feature of our system of
federal jurisprudence which is protected by the Seventh Amendment." Id. at 752. Despite
this broad principle, the Seventh Amendment has never been interpreted to provide a right
to jury trials in state courts. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 471, 503-04
(1985). The determination of whether jury trials are required in individual states rests on
an interpretation of each state's constitution. Fleming James, Jr., Right to Jury Trial in
Civil Actions, 72 YALE L. J. 655 (1963). In fact, the only states that provide no constitu-
tional guarantee to a jury trial in civil cases are Colorado, Utah, Louisiana, and Wyoming.
FRIEDENTHAL, supra, at 471 n.2.
2. See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COM-
MrrMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 9 (1977). Historically, in federal courts the process
of jury selection began with persons or organizations thought to be well-connected to the
community recommending prospective jurors who met certain statutory requirements and
who possessed characteristics such as integrity, judgment, character, and education. See
FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, at 519. In 1966, however, the Fifth Circuit ruled that local
officials could not impose requirements beyond the statutory qualifications for jury selec-
tion. Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 51 (5th Cir. 1966); see FRIEDENTHAL, supra
note 1, at 519 (discussing the impact of the Rabinowitz decision). In 1968, Congress passed
legislation revamping the jury selection process in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1871
(1988); see also FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, at 519-21 (detailing the changes under the
1968 legislation). To serve on a jury, a person had to be at least 18 years of age, a resident
of that particular district for at least one year, sufficiently literate to complete a jury quali-
fication form, fluent in English, mentally and physically capable to serve, and without fel-
ony convictions or pending charges. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b); see also FRIEDENTHAL, supra
note 1, at 520. In addition, Congress, for policy reasons, established guidelines for exclud-
ing or excusing certain persons from service, such as police, firefighters, and women with
small children. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(6); FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, at 520-21. Van Dyke
wrote:
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nire.3 From that group, the petit jury, which will decide questions of fact
at the trial, is selected.4
During the voir dire process,5 each litigant is permitted to exclude, or
strike, jurors in one of two ways.6 First, each party is given the opportu-
nity to strike an unlimited number of jurors for cause.7 A "challenge for
cause" requires the objecting party to show that the juror is biased and
The logical, and desirable, way to impanel an impartial and representative jury-
and the method chosen by Congress-is to put together a complete list of eligible
jurors and select randomly from it, on the assumption that the laws of statistics
will produce representative juries most of the time.... Such a randomly selected
jury will not necessarily be "impartial" in the strict sense of that term, because the
jurors bring to the jury box prejudice and perspectives gained from their lifetimes
of experience. But they will be impartial in the sense that they will reflect the
range of the community's attitudes, which is the best we can do.
VAN DYKE, supra, at 18. The states are not constrained by the Seventh Amendment to the
Federal Constitution in choosing their jury selection procedures, although they must com-
ply with the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, at 521.
3. The jury venire is the panel from which the jury that will decide the case is drawn.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990); see also VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 23.
The jury that hears a case and decides the issues of fact is called a petit jury, whereas the
jury that decides whether there is probable cause to issue an indictment in a criminal case
is referred to as a grand jury. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 855 (6th ed. 1990); see also VAN
DYKE, supra note 2, at 23.
4. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 18.
5. The voir dire process "is designed to expose a juror's lack of qualification or bias."
FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, at 522; Cynthia M. McKnight, Right to Jury Trial, 82 GEo.L.J.
1033, 1043 (1994). The trial judge has broad discretion in conducting the voir dire exami-
nation. McKnight, supra, at 1043-45. The court may question the jurors or allow the attor-
neys involved in the case to pose questions to the jurors. Id. at 1045; FRiEDENTHAL, supra
note 1, at 522. Allowing the attorneys to conduct the voir dire is principally criticized for
creating the opportunity for attorneys to influence the jury pool by arguing their case dur-
ing the selection process. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, at 522; see also supra notes 3-4 and
accompanying text (discussing the procedure for selecting the jury venire).
6. See infra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (noting that a litigant can challenge
individual jurors through either a "challenge for cause" or a "peremptory challenge"). In
addition, a party can challenge the jury selection process as a whole. FRIEDENTHAL, supra
note 1, at 522. This challenge, called a "challenge to the array," asserts that the selection
procedures do not meet the constitutional or statutory requirements. See Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-95 (1946) (sustaining a challenge to an array where women had
been systematically excluded); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 221-24 (1946)
(sustaining a challenge to an array where daily wage earners were excluded); see also
FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, at 522-23 (providing a general discussion of the challenge of
the array).
7. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, at 523; VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 140. A challenge
for cause must be validated by the court and requires a particularized finding of bias or
partiality. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 140. Examples of such factors include the existence
of a relationship with a party or witness; a general bias against members of a certain race or
religion; a witness's previous experience or interest in the subject matter of the litigation;
or a juror's state of mind if it would prevent him or her from being completely impartial.
Id. at 143.
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will be unable to decide the case on only the facts presented.' The second
method of striking jurors is the peremptory challenge, which allows a
party to strike a juror from the venire without providing any justifica-
tion.9 Indeed the peremptory challenge can be exercised "without a rea-
8. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 140. It is important to note that a challenge for cause
requires that the challenging party satisfy the court that the juror meets an objective stan-
dard that warrants disqualification. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, at 523. If a juror deliber-
ately conceals information that prevents actual bias from being discovered, a subsequent
conviction will be reversed. United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1989)
(requiring a new trial where a juror deliberately failed to reveal that the government attor-
ney was the juror's brother-in-law), appeal after remand, 909 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1990); Mc-
Knight, supra note 5, at 1047-48.
9. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 139-40. A peremptory challenge is "[tihe right to
challenge a juror without assigning, or being required to assign, a reason for the chal-
lenge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990). The peremptory challenge
originated in English courts during the 13th century. Patrick J. Guinee, Comment, The
Trend Toward the Extension of Batson to Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 32 Duo.
L. REv. 833, 833 (1994). In all English felony trials, the defendant could exercise 35 per-
emptory challenges, while the prosecutor could challenge an unlimited number of jurors.
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965); see Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's Invidious
Legacy: Discriminatory Juror Exclusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 COR-
NELL L. REv. 336, 339 (1993). Eventually, instead of an unlimited number of peremptory
challenges, prosecutors could direct jurors to "stand aside" after questioning. Id. at 339.
Once the entire panel had been examined and the defendant had exercised his peremptory
challenges, the court would require the prosecutor to show cause for excluding "stand
aside" individuals if there was a deficiency of jurors. Id.
The peremptory challenge became a part of the American legal system when Congress
authorized its use in the Act of 1790. 1 Stat. 119 (1790) (permitting peremptory challenges
in treason cases); Swain, 380 U.S. at 214. The Act provided that in federal courts a defend-
ant was entitled to 35 peremptory challenges in trials for treason and 20 in trials for other
offenses punishable by death. Swain, 380 U.S. at 214. In other trials, both parties had a
right to exercise the peremptory challenge, although the basis for this right is not entirely
clear. Id.; see Swift, supra, at 340 (discussing the origins of the peremptory challenge
mechanism). In 1865, the government had five peremptory challenges in treason and capi-
tal cases while the defendant could exercise twenty; in other types of cases the government
had two and the defendant ten. Swain, 380 U.S. at 214-15. Subsequently, Congress pro-
vided both the government and the defendant with twenty challenges in capital cases; and
where the charge was punishable by more than one year imprisonment, the government
received six and the defendant ten. Id. at 215 n.15.
Presently in federal courts, each party in a criminal case is given twenty peremptory
challenges if the offense is punishable by death. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). If the offense is
punishable by more than one year in prison, the government is entitled to six and the
defendant to 10. Id. If the crime is punishable by less than one year in prison, each side is
entitled to three peremptory challenges. Id. In civil cases, each party is entitled to three
peremptory challenges. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988). In cases where there are multiple plain-
tiffs or defendants, the court may either consider each side a single party or allot additional
peremptory challenges. Id.
The development of the peremptory challenge in the states was similar to that in the
federal system. Swain, 380 U.S. at 215. By 1870, most states had enacted statutes granting
the prosecution at least half the number, and often an equal number, of peremptory chal-
lenges as the defendant. Id. at 216.
[Vol. 44:935
1995] Taking Batson One Giant Step Further
son stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's
control."'" Experts view this challenge as an indispensable tool for as-
sembling a jury that is both apparently and actually impartial.1' The
power to exercise peremptory challenges went virtually unchecked until
the Supreme Court decision in Batson v. Kentucky. 2 In Batson the Court
held that the use of the challenge in a racially discriminatory manner vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 The
Court required an attorney to articulate race-neutral reasons for using
the challenge where the party-opponent established a prima facie case of
racial discrimination.'
4
10. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220; see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUDICIAL ADMINISTRA-
TION DIVISION COMMrITEE ON JURY STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUROR USE
AND MANAGEMENT 78 (1993) [hereinafter ABA COMMITTEE]. The ABA Committee
found that "[pleremptories enable parties to exclude jurors they suspect of bias but of
whom they lack sufficient proof of bias necessary to sustain a challenge for cause." Id.
11. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1438 n.3 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, at 524; see Comment, The Right Of Peremptory Chal-
lenge, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 751, 762 (1957) (arguing that a primary justification for the
peremptory challenge is its tendency to satisfy litigants that their case is being tried by an
impartial jury). Despite this view, the peremptory challenge is not a constitutionally guar-
anteed right. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986); Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. Even
where a defendant has been improperly denied a peremptory challenge the Supreme Court
has declined to reverse a conviction, reasoning that only where the denial results in a bi-
ased jury would it amount to a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 81, 88 (1988), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 441 (1994); see McKnight, supra note 5, at 1050
(discussing the Ross decision).
12. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
13. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. The Court has rejected arguments that discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
violates the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a fair trial. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474
(1990). In Holland, the Court held that a defendant can use the Sixth Amendment to
challenge the jury pool, but not the petit jury itself. Id. at 480-81. The Court has held,
however, that a defendant, improperly denied the right to a peremptory challenge, could
successfully argue a violation of the Sixth Amendment where the denial results in a biased
jury. Ross, 487 U.S. at 88; see McKnight, supra note 5, at 1050 (discussing Ross).
14. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. For a discussion of the procedure followed in challenging
the improper use of an attorney's strikes, see CATHY E. BENNETT AND ROBERT B.
HIRSCHHORN, BENNETt's GUIDE TO JURY SELECTION AND TRIAL DYNAMICS IN CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL LITIGATION §§ 17.11-.14 (1993).
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Until 1994, the Court's restriction on the use of peremptory challenges
was limited to racial discrimination.15 In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.,16
however, the United States Supreme Court expanded Batson 7 and its
progeny' 8 to prohibit an attorney from exercising peremptory challenges
to exclude jurors on the basis of gender.' Applying Batson, the Court
held that excluding jurors on the basis of gender is improper, regardless
of whether the discriminatory strike is exercised by a prosecutor, 20 a de-
fendant,2 ' or a civil litigant.22 Furthermore, it is irrelevant whether the
litigant opposing the use of the challenge is not the same gender as the
excluded juror.23
J. E. B. originated as a paternity action brought by the State of Alabama
on behalf of T.B., the mother of a minor child.24 After each party struck
jurors for cause, the venire comprised ten males and thirty-three fe-
males.25 The State exercised nine of its ten peremptory challenges to
15. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause where a
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race).
16. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
17. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
18. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) (holding that a criminal defend-
ant's use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race violates the Equal
Protection Clause); see infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
holding in McCollum); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991)
(holding that a civil litigant's use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of
race violates the Equal Protection Clause); see infra notes 104-24 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's holding in Edmonson); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991)
(holding that a defendant has standing to object to the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges regardless of the fact that the defendant and excluded juror are not of the same
race), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 366 (1994); see infra notes 89-103 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's holding in Powers).
19. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
20. Id. at 1422; cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-98 (contending that a prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection
Clause); see infra notes 63-88 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's holding in
Batson).
21. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429; cf McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359 (maintaining that a
criminal defendant's use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race
violates the Equal Protection Clause); see infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Court's holding in McCollum).
22. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429; cf Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619 (holding that a civil liti-
gant's use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race violates the
Equal Protection Clause); see infra notes 104-24 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's holding in Edmonson).
23. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430; cf. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,402 (1991) (holding that
a defendant has standing to object to discriminatory use of peremptory challenges regard-
less of the fact that the defendant and excluded juror are not of the same race), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 366 (1994); see infra notes 89-103 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's holding in Powers).
24. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
25. Id.
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strike male jurors,26 while J.E.B., the petitioner, used all but one of his
challenges to strike female jurors.27 The resulting petit jury consisted en-
tirely of females.28 At trial, J.E.B. objected to the State's exercise of per-
emptory challenges, arguing that striking males on the basis of their
gender violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.29 He argued that Batson should apply equally to gender as to ra-
cial discrimination.3" The trial court rejected the argument, and the jury
subsequently found the petitioner to be the father of the child.3 ' The
Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, holding that Batson did
not apply to gender-based strikes.32 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among courts regarding the appli-
cability of Batson to gender-based strikes.
33
The Supreme Court held that intentional gender discrimination in the
exercise of peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause.34
26. Id. at 1422. Alabama employs a "struck-jury" system whereby, once voir dire is
completed and all challenges for cause have been exercised, the litigants alternately strike
the remaining jurors until only twelve remain. ALA. R. Civ. P. 47(b) (1990); J.E.B. 114 S.
Ct. at 1429 n.17 (discussing Alabama's jury selection process).
27. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
28. Id. Although the jury in this case comprised only females, the analysis is consis-
tent, irrespective of whether males or females are improperly excluded. Id at 1428; Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (holding that a state-funded
university which discriminated against males rather than females violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because the gender-based classification was not closely related to important
governmental objectives).
29. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
30. Id.
31. Id. The trial court entered a judgment directing the petitioner to pay child support
and, on post-judgment ruling, reaffirmed its holding that Batson did not apply to gender-
based challenges. Id.
32. J.E.B. v. Alabama, ex reL T.B. 606 So. 2d 156, 157 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), cert.
granted sub nom., 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993). The Alabama Court of Appeals relied on Ala-
bama precedent in affirming the judgment. Id.; see Murphy v. Alabama, 596 So. 2d 42, 43
(Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that the rule prohibiting discrimination in jury selection
does not apply to gender-based strikes), cert. denied sub nom, 596 So. 2d 45 (Ala. 1992),
cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992).
33. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993). Compare United States v.
De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990) (extending Batson to prohibit gender-based per-
emptory challenges), reh'g granted, 930 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1991); Laidler v. State, 627 So. 2d
1263 (Fla. App. 1993) (extending Batson to gender) with United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d
1257, 1262-64 (7th Cir. 1991) (declining to extend Batson to gender), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1080 (1992); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (4th Cir. 1988) (declining to
extend Batson to gender), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990); State v. Adams, 533 So. 2d
1060, 1063 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to extend Batson to gender), cert. denied, 540 So.
2d 293 (La. 1989); see infra notes 148-57 and accompanying text (discussing the conflicting
decisions of federal courts concerning the applicability of Batson to gender-based peremp-
tory challenges).
34. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422. Justice Blackmun asserted that, in light of Batson and its
progeny, it is "axiomatic" that intentional discrimination on the basis of gender violates the
19951
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Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, applied the heightened scru-
tiny traditionally imposed on gender-based classifications. 35 Discrimina-
tion in jury selection, the Court argued, harms the litigants, the excluded
juror, and the community as a whole.36 The Court emphasized that its
Equal Protection Clause because it perpetuates "archaic, and overbroad stereotypes" con-
cerning the roles of men and women. Id.
35. Id. at 1425. Heightened scrutiny is the level of constitutional scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause which is applied to gender-based classifications to protect against
outdated misconceptions concerning the roles of men and women. Id.; see Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976) (holding that the goal of equal protection jurisprudence with
regard to gender-based classifications is to protect against stereotypical notions concerning
the roles of men and women); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 576-80 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing heightened scrutiny). To ascertain which
level of constitutional scrutiny is applied, the first step is to determine which type of classi-
fication is involved. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, at 569-70. General economic classifica-
tions and classifications that burden groups that the Court has determined are not in need
of special protection are afforded rational basis review. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55 (1982) (ruling that an Alaska dividend distribution plan violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause under a rational basis analysis because it discriminated against certain types of
eligible recipients); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, at 580-83. Courts are extremely deferen-
tial to the will of the legislature when analyzing laws under this test. NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra, at 574-75. Under this test a classification will be upheld if it is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 440-42 (1985) (holding that a Texas city ordinance which discriminated against
the mentally retarded violated the Equal Protection Clause as it was not rationally related
to a legitimate governmental objective); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, at 589-90.
An even more scrutinizing analysis than that applied to gender is applied to classifica-
tions that burden persons on the basis of race, national origin, alienage, illegitimacy, or
gender. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, at 576-80. Laws which classify persons on the
basis of race or national origin are considered "suspect" and are subjected to strict scru-
tiny. Id. at 605. Courts analyzing such a statute will give little deference to the legislature
and will uphold the law only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, at 575-76. Laws that
classify persons on the basis of alienage, illegitimacy, and gender are subject to intermedi-
ate scrutiny. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause prevents a state from conditioning the availability of welfare benefits on
United States citizenship or residence in the United States for a specified number of
years); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (holding that a Pennsylvania statute which
set a six-year statute of limitations for paternity actions did not withstand heightened scru-
tiny, and thus denied children born out of wedlock equal protection as mandated by the
Fourteenth Amendment); Craig, 429 U.S. at 210 (holding that an Oklahoma statute
prohibiting the sale of certain types of beer to men under the age of 21, but permitting its
sale to women over 18, was not substantially related to the achievement of an important
government function and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause); see also NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra, at 576-78 (discussing heightened scrutiny). To survive this level of con-
stitutional scrutiny, the law must be substantially related to an important governmental
objective. Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, at 576.
36. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427. The litigants are injured by the risk that the prejudice,
which infected the jury selection process, will distort the entire proceeding. Id. The juror
is injured by the exclusion from the judicial process. Id. Finally, the community also is
harmed because the prejudice will result in a loss of confidence in the judicial process,
particularly where, as here, it exists within the courtroom. Id. at 1427-28; see infra notes
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decision did not signal the elimination of peremptory challenges alto-
gether because those groups that are afforded only rational basis review37
can still be struck.38 The Court concluded that the guarantees of the
Equal Protection Clause would be meaningless if potential jurors could
be excluded based on gender stereotypes.39
Justice O'Connor concurred in the opinion, but wrote separately to ex-
press her concern over the increasing restrictions placed on peremptory
challenges.4" Justice O'Connor emphasized the value of an attorney's in-
tuition in the jury selection process and asserted that the more restric-
tions placed on the peremptory challenge, the more it becomes a
challenge for cause.41 In a separate concurrence, Justice Kennedy agreed
with the majority's result, and illustrated why the Court's precedents
mandated its decision.42 Justice Kennedy argued that a person denied the
right to sit on a jury because of the discriminatory exercise of a peremp-
tory challenge is no less injured than a person denied jury service because
of a law banning her gender from serving on juries.43
174-82 and accompanying text (discussing the injuries that gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges inflict).
37. See supra note 35 (discussing the different levels of constitutional scrutiny applied
to legislation under Equal Protection Clause analysis).
38. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429. Justice Blackmun insisted that while parties still may
remove jurors from the panel whom they feel might be less impartial than others, "gender
simply may not serve as a proxy for bias." Id.
39. Id. at 1430. The Court was concerned that if gender-based strikes were sanctioned,
a party could strike a minority woman from a jury claiming it was based on gender as a
pretext for racial discrimination. Id. Indeed, all four cases involving gender-based per-
emptory challenges to reach the federal courts of appeals involved challenges exercised
against minority women. Id. at 1430 n.18; see United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 217
(5th Cir. 1993) (declining to extend Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges);
United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257,1262-64 (7th Cir. 1991) (declining to extend Batson
to gender), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1080 (1992); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417,
1423 (1990) (extending Batson to prohibit gender-based peremptory challenges), reh'g
granted, 930 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042-43
(4th Cir. 1988) (declining to extend Batson to gender), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990);
see infra notes 148-57 and accompanying text (discussing the federal courts decisions re-
garding the applicability of Batson to gender-based strikes).
40. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 1431. Justice O'Connor emphasized the value of an attorney's intuition in
exercising peremptory challenges specifically. Id. In her opinion, an experienced trial law-
yer could recognize an unsympathetic or biased juror without being able to articulate a
concrete reason sufficient to justify a challenge for cause. Id.
42. Id. at 1433-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see infra note 195 (discussing the prece-
dents that compelled the J.E.B. decision).
43. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1434. Justice Kennedy reasoned that the neutral phrasing of
the Fourteenth Amendment extends equal protection to " 'any person' " regardless of
group status or the personal injury occasioned. Id. Thus, denying any person the right to
participate in the judicial process is prohibited by the mandate of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id.
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In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that the distinctions be-
tween race and gender militate against extending Batson to gender."
The Chief Justice further argued that racial groups warrant a greater de-
gree of protection because they constitute a numerical minority in the
United States, whereas the population is almost equally divided between
the genders.45 Justice Scalia also dissented arguing that, because all
groups are subject equally to exclusion by peremptory challenges, no sin-
gle group is denied equal protection.46 Justice Scalia concluded that ex-
tending Batson to gender would trigger extensive collateral litigation
thereby imposing additional responsibilities on already overburdened
courts.4 7
This Note first examines Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning
Equal Protection violations and the placement of restrictions on an attor-
ney's use of peremptory challenges to prohibit racial discrimination. This
Note then examines the Court's application of those standards to gender-
based challenges and analyzes the balancing test employed in J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B. Next, this Note outlines the difficulties that lower
courts will likely face in implementing the Court's decision in J.E.B. This
Note suggests that the Court's reasoning in J.E.B. will eventually result in
a prohibition on all peremptory challenges based upon classifications that
receive heightened scrutiny under an Equal Protection Clause analysis.
This Note concludes that the competing interests in J.E.B. forced the
Court to strike an imperfect but necessary balance in deciding that, where
a litigant's interest in participating in jury selection collides with the goal
of eliminating invidious discrimination in the judicial system, the former
must cede to the latter.
44. Id. at 1434-36 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Traditional Equal Protection analysis,
the Chief Justice pointed out, affords racial and gender classifications different levels of
constitutional scrutiny: strict scrutiny for race and heightened scrutiny for gender. Id. at
1435; see supra note 35 (discussing the heightened scrutiny analysis applied to gender-
based classifications and strict scrutiny applied to race-based classifications).
45. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1435.
46. Id. at 1436-39. Justice Scalia recognized that if the discrimination resulted in seg-
regated jury venires, he would find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but he
argued that no constitutional violation occurred in J.E.B. because the jury venire com-
prised a fair cross-section of the community, and the litigants struck individual jurors based
on their respective tactical considerations rather than any gender-based animus. Id.
47. Id. at 1439. Justice Scalia believed this overburdening of the court's would occur
particularly in criminal cases, where many defendants have no concern for the cost or dura-
tion of litigation. Id.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF RESTRICTIONS ON PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
A. Constitutional Attacks Prior to Batson
The Supreme Court first addressed the discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges in Swain v. Alabama.48 Relying on Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia,'9 the petitioner 0 in Swain argued that the prosecution violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by exercising its peremptory challenges to dis-
criminate invidiously against African-Americans in the selection of the
petit jury.5 The Court reaffirmed the principle enunciated in Strauder
that racial discrimination aimed at barring qualified groups from jury ser-
vice violates the Constitution as well as the basic precepts of a republican
society.52 Further, any group that may be subject to prejudice is entitled
to relief under the Equal Protection Clause. 3
The Swain Court ruled that the exercise of peremptory challenges to
exclude jurors on the basis of race in a particular case, however, as op-
posed to systematic exclusion, did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.54 The Court found that peremptory challenges were essential to
48. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
49. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). In Strauder, the petitioner was an African-American man
challenging a murder conviction. Id. at 304. The petitioner argued that a West Virginia
statute, restricting jury membership to white males violated the recently adopted Four-
teenth Amendment. Id. at 305. In reversing the conviction, Justice Strong writing for the
Supreme Court, observed that Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment to secure
for the recently emancipated African-American race those rights enjoyed by the white
race. Id. at 306. In Justice Strong's words, "[t]his is one of a series of constitutional provi-
sions having a common purpose; namely, securing to a race recently emancipated, a race
that through many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior
race enjoy." Id. The Court added that the right to a trial by jury is the right to have one's
life or liberty decided by one's peers. Id. at 308. In declaring the West Virginia statute
unconstitutional, the Court found that it was not only discriminatory, but also reinforced
the racial prejudice that Congress sought to eradicate through the passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id. The Court, however, significantly curtailed the impact of the
Strauder decision in Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). There, the Court held that
while the state could not systematically exclude African-Americans from jury service, Afri-
can-American defendants had no right to minority representation on the petit jury. Id. at
322-23.
50. The trial court convicted the petitioner, an African-American, of rape and sen-
tenced him to death. Swain, 380 U.S. at 203.
51. Id. at 203. In addition, the petitioner alleged that the jury selection procedures
operated to exclude black persons from participating on grand juries and petit jury venires.
Id. at 205.
52. Id. at 204.
53. Id at 205. The Court relied on Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), where the
Court ruled that the exclusion of Mexican-Americans from jury service violated the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 482.
54. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221. The petitioner in Swain presented statistical evidence
demonstrating that, although African-American males over 21 years of age constituted
26% of the total population in Talladega County, no African-American had served on a
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eliminate partial jurors and to assure litigants that the jurors will decide
the case on the merits only." The very nature of a peremptory challenge,
the Court concluded, is that it is exercised without reason or explanation,
often based upon impressions, habits, and associations discovered during
voir dire.56 The Court reasoned that subjecting a particular peremptory
challenge to examination would alter the nature and operation of the
strike.57 Notwithstanding these considerations, the Court noted, the per-
emptory challenge is not designed to facilitate or justify the wholesale
exclusion of an entire race from participating in the administration of
justice.58
Accordingly, the Court ruled that a presumption exists that the prose-
cutor used the challenge to obtain a fair and impartial jury.59 A defend-
ant can rebut this presumption by showing that in prior cases the
prosecutor systematically excluded jurors on the basis of race.6' The
Court observed that the record before it contained "no allegation or ex-
planation, and hence no opportunity for the State to rebut, as to when,
why and under what circumstances ... the prosecutor used his strikes to
jury in the previous 15 years. Id. at 205. In Swain, there were eight African-American
males on the petit jury venire, but two were exempt and the remaining six were struck by
the prosecutor. Id. The Court concluded from these statistics that the State had not totally
excluded African-Americans from serving on juries, nor did the statistics reveal that the
number was so small as to constitute forbidden token inclusion. Id. at 206. The Court
found that although this jury selection process resulted in a jury list composed of a smaller
proportion of the African-American population than the white population, the Constitu-
tion does not require a proportionate number of each race to be included on the jury list.
Id. at 208.
55. Id. at 219. The peremptory challenge allows attorneys to expose bias through
probing questions without the fear of incurring a juror's hostility. Id. at 219-20.
56. Id. at 220.
57. Id. at 221-22. Potential jurors are not judged solely as individuals, but also as
members of the groups to which they belong. Id. at 221. The Court stressed that because
the purpose of voir dire is to select an impartial jury, all groups are subject to the peremp-
tory challenge. Id.
58. Id. at 224.
59. Id. at 222.
60. Id. at 223-24. The Court's remedy in Swain demanded such a high evidentiary
burden that it was used effectively on only two occasions between the time the case was
handed down until Batson replaced it. See State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979)
(reversing a conviction for armed robbery where the prosecutor admitted using peremp-
tory challenges to exclude African-American jurors in cases where the defendant was Afri-
can-American); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979) (reversing a conviction where
the prosecutor was not able to rebut a showing of continual and conscious rejection of
African-American jurors through the use of peremptory challenges), cited in Robert L.
Doyel, In Search of a Remedy For The Racially Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 38 OKLA. L. REv. 385, 405 n.140 (1985).
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remove Negroes."61 The Court, therefore, concluded that the petitioner
had not demonstrated with sufficient particularity the systematic exclu-
sion of African-American jurors by the prosecutor.62
B. Limiting A Prosecutor's Peremptory Challenges: Batson v.
Kentucky
In Batson v. Kentucky the Supreme Court substantially limited an at-
torney's use of the peremptory challenge for the first time.63 The prose-
cutor in Batson used his peremptory challenges to strike all four African-
Americans from the jury venire, resulting in an all-white jury. 4 After the
petitioner moved to discharge the jury on the basis of Sixth and Four-
61. Swain, 380 U.S. at 226. The Court cited testimony that in many cases African-
American defendants preferred to have no African-Americans on the jury trying them. Id.
at 225.
62. Id. at 224. To demonstrate that a prosecutor systematically struck African-Ameri-
cans from the jury, the Court required the defendant to prove that the prosecutor struck
jurors in case after case, regardless of the crime committed or the defendant charged. Id.
at 223. This high standard has been criticized as too heavy a burden. Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986). Justice Powell, in Batson, found that this burden effectively insu-
lated a prosecutor's peremptory challenges from constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 92-93. A
defendant's attempt to satisfy this burden is often hampered by the practical fact that the
necessary evidence simply does not exist. Doyel, supra note 60, at 405-07. Generally,
courts do not maintain permanent records of the race of the excluded jurors, who struck
them, or whether they were challenged for cause or peremptorily challenged. Id.
Justice Goldberg, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the majority departed from the
principles articulated in Strauder and retreated from the goal of eliminating discrimination
in jury selection. Swain, 380 U.S. at 231 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Justice Goldberg
claimed that the Court's decision seriously impaired the authority of Strauder and erected
barriers to the elimination of racial discrimination still practiced in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id. Justice Goldberg argued that the statistical evidence presented by
the petitioner established a prima facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
232. TWenty-six percent of the County's population was African-American and, in Justice
Goldberg's words, "no Negro within the memory of persons now living has ever served on
any petit jury in any civil or criminal case tried in Talladega County, Alabama." Id. at 231-
32. Justice Goldberg asserted that although the peremptory challenge had a long tradition,
it was not a constitutionally guaranteed right. Id. at 243. In support of this conclusion,
Justice Goldberg emphasized that Congress has the power to regulate the number of per-
emptory challenges. I&t at 244. He also emphasized that the Supreme Court had restricted
the use of peremptory challenges on several other occasions. Id.; see Stilson v. United
States, 250 U.S. 583, 586-87 (1919) (finding no constitutional violation where several de-
fendants were treated as one party for the purpose of exercising peremptory challenges);
Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 412 (1894) (finding that the rights of the defendant
were not infringed by requiring him to exercise his peremptory challenges before the gov-
ernment). In his view, given the choice between upholding the constitutional mandate of
equal protection or preserving the peremptory challenge, the former is preferable. Swain,
380 U.S. at 246 (Goldberg, J. dissenting).
63. 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). The petitioner was an African-American man indicted on
charges of burglary and receipt of stolen goods. Id. at 82.
64. Id. at 83.
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teenth Amendment violations, the trial court ruled that the constitutional
right to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community applied only
to the selection of the venire.65
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, reversed the petitioner's con-
viction based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.6 6 The Court found that racially-motivated peremptory challenges
injured both the excluded juror and the defendant.67 In addition, the
Court found that exercising racially motivated peremptory challenges un-
dermined public confidence in the judicial system.68 The Court relied on
prior decisions69 that had found an equal protection violation where Afri-
can-American jurors were excluded from the venire in a racially discrimi-
natory manner, which in turn created an equal protection violation in the
selection of the petit jury.70
The Court found that the standard enunciated in Swain v. Alabama
7 1
did not effectively eliminate a prosecutor's racially-motivated peremptory
challenges. 72 As a result, the Court adopted a three-part test for deter-
mining whether a defendant has established a prima facie case of discrim-
65. Id. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction on both counts. Id.
at 84.
66. Id. The Court expressed no view on the petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim. See
supra note 13 (discussing the Court's prior holdings extending a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment claims to selection of the jury venire but not the petit jury).
67. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
68. Id. The harm to the community is exacerbated by the fact that the discrimination
occurs in the courtroom. Id. at 87-88.
69. Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1967) (holding that where African-Ameri-
cans constitute 24.4% of taxpayers, but only 4.7% of grand juries and 9.8% of jury lists,
jury selection procedures violated the Fourteenth Amendment), conformed to, 159 S.E.2d
290 (Ga. 1968); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 553 (1967) (holding that the practice of
selecting juries from tax lists which distinguished African-American citizens by a letter (c)
appearing next to their name violated the Equal Protection Clause), conformed to, 153
S.E.2d 446 (Ga. 1967); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953) (finding a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment where prospective African-American juror's names were
placed on yellow cards, while white juror's names were placed on white cards); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1879) (holding that a statute which prohibited African-
Americans from jury service violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
70. Batson, 476 U.S. at 88 n.10. The Court found that "the Equal Protection Clause
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on
the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the
State's case against a black defendant." Id. at 89.
71. 380 U.S. 202, 222-24 (1965). The Court overruled Swain v. Alabama. Batson, 476
U.S. at 100 n.25.
72. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93. The Court noted that because "this interpretation of
Swain has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, prosecutors' peremptory chal-
lenges are now largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." Id. (footnote omitted); see
supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing the burden of proof imposed in
Swain).
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inatory jury selection.73 Under this test, the defendant must first show he
belongs to a cognizable racial group74 and must establish that the prose-
cutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of the defend-
ant's race from the venire.75 Next, the defendant is entitled to rely on the
fact that peremptory challenges, by their very nature, allow those who
choose to discriminate to do so.76 Finally, the defendant must show facts
and circumstances that raise an inference that the prosecutor used per-
emptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their race.77
If satisfied, this test raises an inference that the prosecutor used
the peremptory challenges in an intentionally discriminatory fashion.78
The burden then shifts to the prosecutor to assert a race-neutral reason
for the exclusion.79 The Court stressed, however, that the burden on
73. It at 96; see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-96 & n.17 (1977) (hold-
ing that where the population of the county was 79.1% Mexican-American, but only 39%
of the persons summoned for grand jury service were Mexican-American, the petitioner
established a prima facie case of racial discrimination). Several courts have had difficulty
applying the test enunciated in Batson. See infra notes 221-25 (discussing lower court ap-
plications of Batson).
74. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Lower courts have held that Batson provides protection
against discriminatory peremptory challenges exercised against: American Indians, United
States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 1987); Hispanics, United States v. Al-
cantar, 832 F.2d 1175, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 1987), appeal after remand, 897 F.2d 436 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 595 (1992); Mexican-Americans, Bueno-Hernandez v. State,
724 P.2d 1132, 1133-35 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 907 (1987); and French-Canadi-
ans, Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 449 N.E.2d 686,691-92 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983), affirmed on
other grounds sub. nom., Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 465 N.E.2d 1180 (Mass. 1984); see
also BENNET-r & HIRSCHHORN, supra note 14, at 329-30 (discussing the various groups to
which lower courts have afforded Batson protection).
75. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
76. Id. The Court noted that there can be no dispute that "peremptory challenges
constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate.' " Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953) (finding a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment where prospective African-American juror's names were
placed on yellow cards, while white juror's names were placed on white cards)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 97. A race-neutral reason is one that is" 'based on something other than the
race of the juror.'" BENNETr & HIRSCHHORN, supra note 14, at 333 (quoting Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991)). Courts have accepted proffered race-neutral reasons
where the juror knew one of the parties, People v. Brown, 505 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987), where the juror doubted his ability to sit in judgment or had a criminal convic-
tion, Thorne v. State, 509 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), superseded, 519 N.E.2d 566
(Ind. 1988). Conversely, in United States v. Brown, 817 F.2d 674, 675-76 (10th Cir. 1987),
the Tenth Circuit held that presuming an African-American attorney would have an unfair
advantage with an African-American juror is unacceptable. Furthermore, People v. Pagel,
232 Cal. Rptr, 104, 108 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028
(1987), held that excluding African-American jurors because the opposing counsel had
struck white jurors is not a race-neutral explanation. Very recently, the Supreme Court in
Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995), held that a prosecutor's proffered explanation that
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 44:935
the prosecutor is less than the burden for supporting a challenge for
cause.
8 0
Chief Justice Burger dissented,81 arguing that the principles announced
in Strauders2 do not apply to petit juries.8 3 The Chief Justice asserted
that it is not necessarily discriminatory to use a peremptory challenge to
exclude a potential juror on the belief that the juror will be biased in
favor of a litigant because they share the same race.' Chief Justice Bur-
ger also voiced his misgivings regarding any future extension of the
Court's decision.
8 5
he struck two African-American jurors because they had long, unkempt hair, moustaches,
and beards satisfied his burden of articulating race-neutral explanations for the strikes. Id.
at 1771. The Court stated that facial hair is not a characteristic associated with any race.
Id. For a discussion of proffered race-neutral reasons that courts have accepted and re-
jected, see BENNETT & HIRSCHHORN, supra note 14, at 333-35.
80. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. A prosecutor may not, however, explain his challenges on
the grounds that an African-American juror will be partial to the defendant because of
their common race. Id. If the Court were to sanction any race-based peremptory chal-
lenges, the guarantee of equal protection to all citizens, embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment, would be meaningless. Id. at 97-98. In addition, the decision promotes re-
spect for the criminal justice system by ensuring that no qualified juror is excluded from
participation. Id. at 99.
Justice Marshall, in concurrence, argued that the Court's decision eliminates the discrim-
inatory use of the peremptory challenge in theory only. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring). The only way to eliminate discriminatory strikes completely, according to Justice
Marshall, is to ban the peremptory challenge altogether. Id. at 103. Justice Marshall sug-
gested that "[a] prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to
the conclusion that a prospective black juror is 'sullen,' or 'distant,' a characterization that
would not have come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically." Id. at 106.
81. Id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
82. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that a statute prohibiting
African-Americans from serving on juries violated the Fourteenth Amendment); see supra
note 49 (discussing the Strauder decision).
83. Batson, 476 U.S. at 122-23.
84. Id. (quoting United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 554 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc)).
Chief Justice Burger distinguished between the implication that an entire race is unfit for
jury service and merely suggesting that each race may favor its own. Id. (construing Leslie,
783 F.2d at 554). The former is insulting and a violation of the Constitution, while the
latter is not. Id.
85. Id. at 124. The Chief Justice predicted that, applying conventional equal protec-
tion principles, a defendant could object to the use of peremptory challenges exercised on
the basis of gender, age, religious or political affiliation, mental capacity, number of chil-
dren, living arrangements, and employment in a particular industry or profession. Id. (cit-
ing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,450 (1985) (holding that
a Texas city ordinance that discriminated with respect to the mentally retarded violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it was not rationally related to a governmental objec-
tive)); see also, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)
(holding that a Minnesota statute banning the sale of milk in certain containers was ration-
ally related to the legitimate state interest of promoting conservation and easing solid
waste disposal problems); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200 (1976) (holding that an
Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to men under the age of 21 and women
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Justice Rehnquist, dissenting,86 rejected the majority's ruling as con-
trary to the holding of Swain v. Alabama. 7 He concluded that no ine-
quality results from exercising peremptory challenges to strike African-
American jurors so long as, in cases involving defendants of other races,
jurors of the same race as the defendant may be excluded.88
C. Prohibiting Race-Based Strikes Regardless of the Relationship
Between the Litigant and the Excluded Juror: Powers v. Ohio
In Powers v. Ohio,89 the Court addressed whether a criminal defendant
may raise the claim of discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge, on
behalf of the excluded juror, even if the defendant and the excluded juror
do not share the same race.90 The critical issue in Powers was whether
the defendant had third-party standing to raise a claim of racial discrimi-
under 18 was not substantially related to the achievement of an important government
function and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1976) (holding that an age classification requiring state
police to retire at age 50 was rationally related to the important governmental objective of
protecting the public by ensuring physically fit police officers); United States Dep't of Ag-
riculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (holding that a statute, rendering ineligible
for Food Stamp assistance any household containing an individual unrelated to any other
member of the household, was not rationally related to the purpose of maintaining ade-
quate nutrition and stimulating the agricultural economy); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 486 (1970) (upholding a statute that placed a fixed limit on the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children Program grants, regardless of family size, because it was rationally
related to the legitimate state interest in providing support to needy families and did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491
(1955) (holding that a provision of an Oklahoma statute prohibiting any person who is not
a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist from fitting, duplicating, or replacing lenses was
rationally related to the legitimate state interest of regulating visual care). Chief Justice
Burger argued that, in forcing an attorney to explain the basis for a peremptory challenge,
the Court undermined the very definition of the strike. Batson, 476 U.S. at 127. The Chief
Justice observed that "[a]nalytically, there is no middle ground: A challenge either has to
be explained or it does not. It is readily apparent, then, that to permit inquiry into the
basis for a peremptory challenge would force 'the peremptory challenge [to] collapse into
the challenge for cause.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir.
1984)).
86. Batson, 476 U.S. at 134 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 134-35; see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965) (holding that the use
of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors in a particular case is not a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause).
88. Batson, 476 U.S. at 137-38.
89. 499 U.S. 400 (1991), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 366 (1994).
90. Id. at 402. The defendant, a white man charged with two counts of aggravated
murder, challenged the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude seven Afri-
can-Americans from serving on the jury. Id. at 402-03. The trial court denied the peti-
tioner's request to compel the prosecutor to articulate his reasons for excluding the
African-American jurors. Id. at 403.
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nation on behalf of the excluded juror.9' To establish standing, the liti-
gant first must have suffered an "injury in fact," giving him a "sufficiently
concrete interest" in the outcome of the disputed issue.92 Second, a close
relationship must exist between the litigant and the third party.93 Third,
some hindrance preventing the third party from protecting his own inter-
ests must exist.94
The Court found that racially discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges causes a defendant cognizable injury,9 5 thereby undermining the
fairness of the judicial system.96 Next, the Court found that a relationship
exists between a criminal defendant and a juror, in that the latter is called
to decide the fate of the former,97 and both the excluded juror and the
defendant share an interest in eliminating racial discrimination from the
courtroom.98 Finally, the Court examined the likelihood and ability of
the excluded juror to assert his own rights to be free from discrimina-
tion.99 Although the excluded juror could bring his own claim, the Court
noted that such cases are rare. 100
91. Id. at 410 (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976)). Singleton outlines the
standard to determine if a party has standing to raise an issue on behalf of a third person.
Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114-16. There, the Supreme Court held that physicians had standing
to challenge the constitutionality of a Missouri statute excluding abortions from Medicaid
benefits. Id. at 113. The Court reasoned that if the physicians prevailed in their suit, they
would benefit by receiving payments for abortions. Id. at 113; see generally Henry P.
Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1984) (discussing the issue of
third party standing in greater detail).
92. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (quoting Singleton, 428 U.S. at 112).
93. Id. (quoting Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113-14). In Singleton, the Court found that the
relationship between the litigant and the third party must be such that the former is as
effective a proponent of the rights involved as the latter. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115.
94. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (citing Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115-16).
95. Id.
96. Id. When discrimination is sanctioned at the outset of a case, the trial will neither
be perceived as fair nor instill respect for the law. Id. at 412.
97. Id. at 413. The Court asserted that "[v]oir dire permits a party to establish a rela-
tion, if not a bond of trust, with the jurors." Id. (emphasis omitted).
98. Id. An improperly excluded juror must endure the public humiliation of having
been denied participation in the justice system because of his race, while the criminal de-
fendant loses confidence in the fairness of the system. Id. at 411-14. In addition, the de-
fendant is uniquely motivated to act on behalf of the excluded juror as this may lead to a
reversal of the conviction. Id. at 414.
99. Id. at 414-15.
100. Id. Because excluded jurors are not part of the jury selection process they have no
opportunity to voice their objections at the time of exclusion. Id. at 414. Moreover, there
remains little incentive to bring a separate claim because of high litigation costs and the
small financial reward for success. Id. at 415. Justice Kennedy remarked that "[tihe real-
ity is that a juror dismissed because of race probably will leave the courtroom possessing
little incentive to set in motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his own rights."
Id.
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The Court thus concluded that a defendant maintains standing to ob-
ject on behalf of jurors excluded on the basis of race. 1 The Court also
observed that other reasons may exist for excluding a juror because of his
race, aside from the fact that the defendant and juror are of the same
race.1" 2 Finally, the Court noted that the reasons for prohibiting the ex-
clusion where the defendant and the juror share the same race also neces-
sitate prohibiting the exclusion when they do not share the same race.
10 3
D. Applying Batson to Civil Litigants: Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,"4 the Court extended the Bat-
son rule to civil litigants. °5 The respondent in Edmonson had used two
of its three peremptory challenges, over objection, to exclude African-
Americans from the jury.0 6 On appeal, an en banc panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that Batson was inap-
plicable to civil cases.
10 7
101. lId Powers is a significant expansion of Batson in that Batson required a defend-
ant to show that he was a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor had
struck jurors of the defendant's own race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). By
eliminating this requirement, the Powers Court placed more emphasis on protecting the
rights of the excluded juror. Michael J. Desmond, Note, Limiting A Defendant's Peremp-
tory Challenges: Georgia v. McCollum and the Problematic Extension of Equal Protection,
42 CAmT. U. L. REV. 389, 404 (1993). The concern for the excluded juror and the commu-
nity as a whole has been dubbed the "multiple ends" of Batson. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S.
255, 259 (1986).
102. Powers, 499 U.S. at 416.
103. Id. The court wrote, "to say that the race of the defendant may be relevant to
discerning bias in some cases does not mean that it will be a factor in others, for race
prejudice stems from various causes and may manifest itself in different forms." Id.
104. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
105. Id. at 616. The petitioner, an African-American man, was injured while working at
a construction site and sued the respondent in federal court. Id. He claimed that the
respondent was negligent in allowing a company truck to roll backwards and pin him
against construction equipment. Id.
106. Id. at 616-17. The petitioner objected to the challenges and requested that the trial
court require the respondent to articulate race-neutral reasons for striking the jurors. Id.
at 617; see supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text (discussing the three part test set out
in Batson). The district court held that Batson did not apply to civil proceedings. Edmon-
son, 500 U.S. at 617. The jury, composed of 11 white persons and one African-American,
returned a verdict in favor of the petitioner, but attributed 80% of the negligence to him
and accordingly, reduced his award to $18,000. Id.
107. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.), mot. granted, cert.
granted, 498 U.S. 809 (1990). This was actually the second hearing before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 219. After the first hearing, a panel of
the court held that Batson did apply to civil cases, finding that private parties become state
actors when exercising peremptory challenges. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860
F.2d 1308 (1988), on recons., en banc, 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.), mot. granted., cert. granted,
19951
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To invoke the Fourteenth Amendment's mandate of equal protection
under the law, the complaining party must show that the injury resulted
from state action. 10 8 In order for an equal protection violation to occur a
private litigant's exercise of a peremptory challenge must be character-
ized as state action.10 9 Thus, for a private litigant to be bound by the
Constitution, governmental authority must dominate the activity so per-
vasively that the private litigant is considered to act with governmental
authority.'10 Where this exists, the private litigant is considered a state
actor when performing the activity."'
The Court had no difficulty finding that governmental authority domi-
nates the use of peremptory challenges." 2 The Court noted that peremp-
tory challenges assist in jury selection and thus have meaning only in a
courthouse." 3 Because peremptory challenges are not a constitutional
right, they exist only where the government provides litigants with the
opportunity to exercise them.
114
Having determined that the exercise of peremptory challenges qualifies
as an activity dominated by governmental control, the Court next found
498 U.S. 809 (1990). After this decision, the full court ordered a rehearing. Edmonson,
500 U.S. at 617.
108. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619. Constitutional guarantees only apply where the state
acts to restrict one's protected liberty. Id.; see also National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191-99 (1988) (holding that the imposition of disciplinary sanc-
tions against a basketball coach by a state university acting in compliance with NCAA
rules and recommendations did not turn the NCAA into a state actor, thus the association
could not be held liable for a violation of the coach's civil rights); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-72 (1972) (holding that a private club is not a state actor simply
because it has a liquor license issued by a state agency, and therefore, the club's discrimina-
tory practices are not subject to constitutional scrutiny).
109. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619-20. The Court outlined the test for private conduct
constituting state action in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). In
Lugar, a creditor seized the property of a debtor in an ex parte proceeding pursuant to
statutory authority. Id. at 924-25. The Court employed a two-part test in determining that
the creditor's actions amounted to state action. Id. at 937. First, the deprivation giving rise
to the state action claim must stem from an exercise of authority granted by the state. Id.
Second, the party acting must "fairly be said to be a state actor." Id.
110. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620; see Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939-41 (discussing private ac-
tion that is attributable to the government).
111. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621; see Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42 (holding that a private
party's participation in the seizure of property is sufficient to characterize that party as a
state actor); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988) (holding that a private physician
who contracted with a prison to attend to inmates' medical needs is a state actor).
112. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620.
113. Id. Justice Kennedy observed that "[bly their very nature, peremptory challenges
have no significance outside a court of law." Id.
114. Id. In deciding that the state action requirement was satisfied, the Court com-
mented that "[w]ithout this authorization, granted by an Act of Congress itself, Leesville
would not have been able to engage in the alleged discriminatory acts." Id. at 621.
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that a private litigant is a state actor when exercising the challenge.' 15
The voir dire process, the Court found, is substantially controlled by the
trial judge." 6 In addition, the Court reasoned that jury selection is a
traditional state function,' 7 and the fact that private litigants participate
in the selection does not change the governmental character of the
power. 1 8 The Court finally stressed that the courtroom, more than any-
place else, must be free from racial discrimination lest it appear to sup-
port it.119
In dissent, Justice O'Connor rejected the Court's conclusion that a liti-
gant functions as a state actor when exercising peremptory challenges.'
20
Justice O'Connor argued that the government is responsible for providing
the forum for dispute resolution, but not necessarily for everything that
occurs in that forum.121 Justice O'Connor also asserted that, because the
state always has employed private litigants to partake in the jury selection
115. Id. at 624.
116. Id. at 623-24. In fact, the Court's authority must be invoked for the parties to
exercise the challenge. Id. at 624. Indeed, after a juror is struck, it is the court which must
inform the juror that he is excused. Id. The Court noted that "[w]ithout the direct and
indispensable participation of the judge, who beyond all question is a state actor, the per-
emptory challenge system would serve no purpose." Id.
117. Id. at 624-25. A jury, the Court observed, is a "quintessential governmental
body," brought together by the power of the state and having its judgment enforced by the
state. Id. at 624. The Court recognized that where the government confers the power to
choose government employees or officials on a private body, that body will be bound by
the Constitution. Id. at 625.
118. Id. at 626. At this point the Court analogized to other cases where private persons
performing state functions were found to be state actors. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
54 (1988) (holding that a private physician who contracted with a prison to attend to in-
mates' medical needs is considered a state actor); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
(finding that a private political organization which selected only white candidates to run
for office is subject to constitutional restraints).
119. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628. Justice Kennedy remarked that because the court-
room is where the law itself unfolds, if racially motivated peremptory challenges were per-
mitted, the integrity of the judicial system would be undermined. Id. The Court relied on
Powers to conclude that the civil litigant may raise the excluded juror's rights on his behalf.
Id. at 628-29. Applying the Powers rationale, the Edmonson Court found that when per-
emptory challenges are used to discriminate, the opposing litigant not only suffers a con-
crete, redressable injury but also has a close relation with the excluded juror. Id. at 629-30;
see supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text (discussing application of the third-party
standing doctrine enunciated in Powers). The Court concluded that in a civil proceeding,
the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury is just as paramount, the verdicts are just
as binding, and the mandate from Congress to eliminate racial discrimination is just as
strong as in a criminal proceeding. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630.
120. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 631-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This argument would
also form the basis for Justice O'Connor's dissent in Georgia v. McCollum. See infra note
134 (discussing Justice O'Connor's dissent in McCollum).
121. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 632. The decision to exercise a peremptory challenge lies
solely within the litigant's discretion, without any governmental encouragement. Id. at
635. Justice O'Connor asserted that "[t]he government otherwise establishes its require-
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process and never has performed this function exclusively, jury selection
is not a traditional government function. 122 Moreover, when attorneys
exercise a peremptory challenge, they do so to effectively protect their
clients, not simply to assist the government in jury selection. 23 Justice
O'Connor concluded that while the goal of eliminating racism from the
courtroom is necessary and important, every courtroom action is not state
action. 124
E. The Criminal Defendant As A State Actor: Georgia v. McCollum
In Georgia v. McCollum,125 the Court addressed a question unan-
swered by prior cases: whether the Constitution prohibits a criminal de-
fendant from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner.' 26 The Court's decision balanced the goal of
eliminating racial discrimination in jury selection against the criminal de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
127
The Court acknowledged that the rule in Batson was designed, in part,
to protect individual jurors from being excluded on account of their
race.' 28 In addition, the Court found that racially motivated peremptory
ments for jury service, leaving to the private litigant the unfettered discretion to use the
strike for any reason." Id. at 638.
122. Id. at 640. The state action test requires, inter alia, the activity in question to be a
traditional function performed exclusively by the state. Id. Indeed, Justice O'Connor ar-
gued, it cannot be maintained that the government traditionally has performed this func-
tion exclusively because the peremptory challenge is older than the government itself. Id.
123. Id. at 642. Justice O'Connor relied on Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312
(1981), which stated that a public defender does not act under color of state law when
representing his client. Id. at 325; see infra note 131 (discussing the Dodson case).
124. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 643-44.
125. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
126. Id. at 2352. The respondents in McCollum, who were white, were indicted for
allegedly assaulting two African-Americans, Id. at 2351. A leaflet was distributed in the
local African-American community that described the attack and urged residents to boy-
cott the respondents' business. Id. Prior to jury selection, the prosecutor moved to pro-
hibit the respondents from exercising peremptory challenges to exclude African-American
jurors. Id. The state argued that the victim's race was a factor in the assault and that the
respondents had indicated their intent to exclude African-Americans from the jury. Id.
The trial court denied the motion holding that Batson's prohibition against racially moti-
vated peremptory challenges did not apply to a criminal defendant. Id. at 2352. The issue
was certified for immediate appeal by the Georgia Supreme Court, which with three jus-
tices dissenting, affirmed; thereby declining to restrict a criminal defendant's right to exer-
cise peremptory challenges. State v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688, 689 (Ga. 1991), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
127. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357-58; see supra note 1 and
accompanying text (discussing the right to trial by jury).
128. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353. The Court reasoned that it is irrelevant who initi-
ates the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges because the resultant harm to the
excluded juror is the same. Id. When a juror is struck impermissibly, the Court found,
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challenges undermine public confidence in both the jury selection proce-
dure and in the justice system as a whole.129 A court that allows the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, regardless of which side ini-
tiates the challenge, "is a willing participant in a scheme that could only
undermine the very foundation of our system of justice-our citizen's
confidence in it.' 130 The exercise of a peremptory challenge is performed
in the context of selecting the jury-"a quintessential governmental
body"-and as such must adhere to constitutional principles.'
In balancing the principles of Batson and its progeny against the rights
of the criminal defendant, the Court refused to accord criminal defend-
ants broad latitude in exercising peremptory challenges where doing so
would perpetuate racial stereotypes.132 The Court announced that the
right to a fair trial does not entail the right to engage in racial discrimina-
"[riegardless of who invokes the discriminatory challenge, there can be no doubt that the
harm is the same-in all cases, the juror is subjected to open and public racial discrimina-
tion." Id. Protecting the rights of the excluded jurors is one of the "multiple ends" for
which Batson was designed. Id.; see supra note 101 (noting the "multiple ends" of Batson).
129. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353-54. The Court opined that public confidence in the
law is especially important in racially-charged trials where tempers flare and emotions run
high. Id. at 2354. One of the purposes of having a jury is to impress upon the criminal
defendant and the community that a judgment is given according to law by persons who
are fair. Id. at 2353. That purpose is frustrated, the Court noted, when litigants act in
violation of the very laws which the jury is brought together to uphold. Id. at 2353-54.
130. Id. at 2354.
131. Id. at 2356. The Court ruled that a state has standing to raise a claim of discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges on behalf of the excluded juror. Id. at 2357. First, the
state suffers cognizable injury when a defendant discriminates in the exclusion of jurors
because "the fairness and integrity of its own judicial process is undermined." Id. Second,
as the juror is the representative of all its citizens, there is a relation that permits and even
compels the state to protect the Fourteenth Amendment rights of its jurors. Id. Finally, as
argued in Powers, the barriers are great for an excluded juror to bring a claim on his own
behalf. Id.; see supra notes 100-01 (discussing the difficulties an excluded juror must face
in enforcing his own rights). The Court also addressed the argument that a public defender
is not a state actor when representing a criminal defendant. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356;
see also supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's dissent
in Edmonson which argued that a private litigant is not a state actor for purposes of equal
protection analysis). The argument relied on Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 314
(1981), which involved a section 1983 claim by a defendant asserting that a public defender
violated his constitutional rights. Id. The Court ruled that a public defender does not act
under color of state law when representing his client, stating that "it is the constitutional
obligation of the State to respect the professional independence of the public defenders
whom it engages." Id. at 321-22, 325 (footnote omitted). The McCollum Court distin-
guished activity associated with selecting the jury from that at issue in Polk and concluded
that when the government confers upon a party the power to choose a body such as a jury,
that party is bound by constitutional limitations. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356.
132. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358. The Court noted, however, that this holding does
not preclude a defendant from excluding a juror when he has reason to believe that the
particular juror will not be impartial because of racial prejudice. Id. at 2358-59. Mecha-
nisms exist for confronting and removing jurors whose racism will pervert their judgment,
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tion. 133 As in Batson and its progeny, when the state establishes a prima
facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the defendant
must answer with a race-neutral justification for the strikes.13 4
F. The History of Gender Discrimination in Jury Selection
Traditionally, women were excluded entirely from jury service.'l 5
Even after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment 36 in 1920,
but this does not permit a defendant to exclude a juror based on assumptions regarding
that juror's race. Id. at 2359.
133. Id. at 2358. The Court also held that its ruling would not infringe upon a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by forcing defense counsel to reveal trial strategy or
privileged communication in articulating race-neutral reasons for a peremptory challenge.
Id. In such a situation, the defense attorney could explain the strike in camera to avoid
revealing trial strategy to the prosecution. Id.
134. Id. at 2359. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas concurred in the judg-
ment. Id. They argued, in separate opinions, that no state action occurs when a criminal
defendant exercises a peremptory challenge. Id. Insofar as Edmonson set a precedent,
however, they conceded that the Court must extend the restriction to include a criminal
defendant. Id. Justice Thomas argued that the Court's decision signified a mis-ordering of
priorities by elevating the right of an individual to sit on a jury above the rights of a crimi-
nal defendant. Id. at 2360.
Justice O'Connor dissented, citing her reasoning in Powers. Id. at 2361; Edmonson, 500
U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Justice O'Connor's dissent in Edmonson). Justice O'Connor argued that Polk
County v. Dodson already had rejected the notion that a criminal defense attorney was a
state actor when representing a defendant. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2361-62; Polk County
v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981). That the Court had prohibited race-based peremptory
challenges by prosecutors in Batson and civil litigants in Edmonson, by itself, does not
warrant extending the principle to criminal defendants. McCollum, 114 S. Ct. at 2363. In
support, Justice O'Connor noted that on other occasions the Court had held the prosecu-
tion to higher standards than the defense. Id. at 2364; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963) (requiring the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable to the accused). The need
for independence was even more apparent in this case because of the direct adversarial
relationship between the criminal defendant and the government. McCollum, 114 S. Ct. at
2363. Justice O'Connor stressed that "[firom arrest, to trial, to possible sentencing and
punishment, the antagonistic relationship between the government and the accused is clear
for all to see." Id.; see also Susan M. Sabers, Note, The Absence of State Action in Georgia
v. McCollum, 39 S.D. L. REV. 159, 174 (1994) (arguing that there is no room for a criminal
defense attorney to serve the interests of a state when representing a client). Sabers argues
that the result reached by the majority in McCollum was outcome-determined by the ma-
jority's decision to rid the courtroom of racial discrimination. Id. at 173. She asserts that
in determining that a criminal defendant is a state actor, the Court did not correctly apply
the state action test to the facts of McCollum. Id. at 172. In all criminal cases, Sabers
maintains, the role of criminal defendant and state actor are mutually exclusive. Id. at 174.
135. In Strauder v. West Virginia, while holding that states could not exclude African-
Americans from jury service, the Court found that states were free to restrict jury service
to males. 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879); see supra note 49 (discussing Strauder).
136. U.S. CoNsT. amend XIX. The Nineteenth Amendment states that "[t]he right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of sex." Id.
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which guaranteed to all women the right to vote, many states continued
to deny women the right to serve on juries.137 Indeed, even those states
that purported to allow female jurors often implemented procedures to
deter women from participating.138 These barriers included affirmative
registration requirements 139 and automatic exemptions for all women. 4 °
Exclusion of women from jury service rested on stereotypical attitudes
that women were "too fragile and virginal to withstand the polluted
courtroom atmosphere.'
14 1
In 1946, the Supreme Court in Ballard v. United States' 42 addressed the
propriety of excluding women from jury service. The Ballard Court
noted that excluding women from juries resulted in a loss of diversity'43
and ruled that women could not be excluded from jury service in federal
courts. 144 Women were not permitted to serve on juries in all fifty states,
however, until 1968 when Mississippi repealed its statute barring women
from jury service. 145 Even still, it was not until 1975 that the Supreme
137. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1423 (1994).
138. Id.
139. An affirmative registration requirement exempted women from jury service unless
they registered. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1961) (upholding an affirmative regis-
tration statute that exempted women from mandatory jury service).
140. Automatic exemptions permitted women to decline to serve on a jury because of
their gender. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289 (1947) (noting that, in 1942, 15 of the 28
states that permitted women to serve on juries allowed them to claim a gender-based
exemption).
141. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1423 (citing Bailey v. State, 219 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Ark. 1949)
(commenting that "[c]riminal court trials often involve testimony of the foulest kind, and
they sometimes require consideration of indecent conduct, the use of filthy and loathsome
words, references to intimate sex relationships, and other elements that would prove hu-
miliating, embarrassing and degrading to a lady")).
142. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
143. In Ballard, a mother and her son were indicted for mail fraud involving the promo-
tion of an allegedly fraudulent religious program. Id. at 194. The government conceded
that women were not included on the jury panel in the jurisdiction where the case was
tried. Id. at 190.
144. Id Justice Douglas, in Ballard, argued that:
[T]he two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is
different from a community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence
one on the other is among the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from
either may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct
quality is lost if either sex is excluded.
Id. at 193-94 (footnote omitted). This decision applied only to federal courts and even 15
years later, the Court still was unwilling to extend Ballard's prohibition on the exclusion of
women from jury service to the states. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61 (1961). In Hoyt,
the Court found that because of a woman's status as the center of home and family life, it
was reasonable for a state to exempt women from jury service and permit them to serve
only if they volunteered. Id. at 62.
145. Deborah L. Forman, What Difference Does it Make? Gender and Jury Selection 2
U.C.L.A. W. L.J. 35, 38 (1992). Women were not permitted to serve on juries in Alabama
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Court declared unconstitutional, under the Sixth Amendment, a Louisi-
ana statute which provided for affirmative registration for women, thus
effectively ending the exclusion of women from jury service in state
courts.
146
Two years after Batson's prohibition against race-based peremptory
challenges, 147 the constitutionality of gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges first surfaced in United States v. Hamilton .148 In Hamilton, the
defendants objected to the government's exclusion of three African-
American females from the jury. 4 9 On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions. 150 The court
rejected the defendants' argument that the Equal Protection Clause pro-
hibited gender-based peremptory challenges,' 5' ruling that no authority
existed supporting such an extension of Batson 52 Following Hamilton,
the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits also declined to
extend Batson to gender-based strikes.'53
until 1966, when the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama de-
clared a state statute barring women from service unconstitutional. White v. Crook, 251 F.
Supp. 401, 408 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (per curiam) (holding that the practice of excluding Afri-
can-Americans from jury service violated Alabama law and the United States Constitution
and that a statute excluding women from jury service violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause).
146. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975). Taylor involved a Louisiana state
statute exempting women from jury service unless they filed a written declaration of their
desire to serve. Id. at 523. The defendant claimed that this statute violated his Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial by a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.
Id. at 524. The Supreme Court agreed, and rejected the State's argument that women's
distinctive role in society was a rational basis for the exemption. Id. at 533-34. The Court
concluded that more than a rational basis is needed to justify excluding an entire segment
of society from jury service and the State had failed to advance any such argument war-
ranting exclusion. Id. at 534.
147. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
148. 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990).
149. Id. at 1040. In Hamilton, several African-American defendants, convicted on
drug-related charges, argued that the prosecutor had exercised race and gender-based per-
emptory challenges in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1039-40.
150. Id. at 1043. The Court of Appeals accepted as race-neutral and reasonable the
prosecutor's assertion that he struck the female jurors because he wanted more men on the
jury. Id. at 1041.
151. Id. at 1040.
152. Id. at 1042. The court asserted that if the Supreme Court had intended Batson to
prohibit gender-based strikes, it would have abolished peremptory challenges altogether or
included gender, age, and other classifications within the prohibition of race-based per-
emptory challenges. Id.
153. United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1993). In Broussard, the
district court refused to allow the defendant to exercise peremptory challenges against two
females. Id. at 217. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
conviction, finding that the district court's extension of Batson prohibiting the defendant
from exercising peremptory challenges was not harmless error. Id. at 221. The United
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In United States v. De Gross,5 4 however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit extended Batson to prohibit a defendant
from exercising gender-based peremptory challenges.' 5 5 The Ninth Cir-
cuit applied the heightened scrutiny test afforded gender-based classifica-
tions which upholds the classification only if it is "substantially related to
the achievement of important governmental objectives." 5 6 The court
concluded that gender-based challenges are based on assumptions that
persons of that gender are unqualified to serve as jurors and, therefore,
such challenges are not substantially related to the important governmen-
tal objective of ensuring an impartial jury.' 57
II. JEB. V. ALABAMA ExREL. .B.: EXPANDING BATSON'S
PRINCIPLES TO PROHIBIT GENDER DISCRIMINATION
In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB., the petitioner objected to the State's
exercise of peremptory challenges to eliminate males from the jury. 58
The trial court rejected the petitioner's argument that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause prohibits gender-based peremptory challenges. 59 On appeal,
the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the decision, refusing to
extend Batson to gender-based strikes. 6° The United States Supreme
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed this question in United States v.
Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1080 (1992). In Nichols, the
defendant argued that his due process rights were violated when the prosecutor used per-
emptory challenges to strike all the African-American females from the venire. Id. at
1262. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, ruling that striking the jurors because
they were females with assailable family backgrounds was permissible under Batson. Id. at
1263-64.
154. 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990).
155. Id. at 1423. The defendant was "convicted ... of two counts of aiding and abetting
the transportation of an alien within the United States." Id. at 1419. At trial the govern-
ment objected to the defendant's exercise of a peremptory challenge to exclude a male
juror. Id. The government established that the defendant previously exercised peremp-
tory challenges to exclude seven male jurors. Id. After the defendant offered no explana-
tion, the trial court disallowed the challenge. Id. In addition, the defendant objected to
the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge to strike a Hispanic woman. Id. The prose-
cutor admitted that his reason for striking the juror was gender-based. Id. at 1419-20.
156. Id. at 1422; see supra note 35 (discussing the heightened scrutiny test applied to
gender-based classifications).
157. DeGross, 913 F.2d at 1422. The Court asserted that like race, a person's gender is
simply not related to his fitness as a juror. Id. In reaching its decision, the Court relied
heavily on the Batson Court's discussion of the injuries inflicted on the litigants, the ex-
cluded juror, and the community. Id. at 1422-23.
158. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422; see supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (discussing
the facts of J.E.B.).
159. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
160. 606 So. 2d 156 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993). The
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals relied on Alabama precedent in affirming the judgment.
Id at 157 (citing Ex parte Murphy, 596 So. 2d 45 (Ala.) (holding that the rule prohibiting
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Court granted certiorari to resolve a growing conflict among state and
federal courts.
161
In J.E.B., the Supreme Court held that the use of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude jurors on the basis of gender violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 62 Unlike Batson, which was limited specifically to a
prosecutor's actions, 63 the J.E.B. Court prohibited all participants in the
jury selection process from exercising gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges. 164 In reaching its conclusion, the majority found that the histories
of racial and gender discrimination were similar enough to warrant an
expansion of Batson .165 Although the Court repeatedly has emphasized
discrimination in jury selection does not apply to gender-based strikes), cert denied, 113 S.
Ct. 86 (1992)).
161. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993) (granting certiorari). Com-
pare United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th Cir. 1990) (extending Batson to
prohibit gender-based peremptory challenges); Laidler v. State, 627 So. 2d 1263, 1264 (Fla.
App. 1993) (extending Batson to gender) with United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257,
1262-64 (7th Cir. 1991) (declining to extend Batson to gender), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1080
(1992); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (4th Cir. 1988) (declining to
extend Batson to gender), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990); State v. Adams, 533 So. 2d
1060, 1063 (La. App. 1988) (refusing to extend Batson to gender), cert. denied, 540 So. 2d
338 (La. 1989); see supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text (discussing the conflicting
decisions of federal courts as to the applicability of Batson to gender-based peremptory
challenges).
162. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court.
Id. at 1421. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined in Justice Blackmun's
opinion. Id. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy each filed an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment. Id. at 1430 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 1433 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Chief
Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1434 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joined.
Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (prohibiting a prosecutor from exercising peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude members of the defendant's race from serving on the jury); see supra
notes 71-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's ruling in Batson).
164. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430. Although the Court did not specifically rule that its
holding applies to all exercises of peremptory challenges, neither did the Court restrict its
holding to any certain actor, such as the prosecutor, as it had in previous cases involving
racial discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. Thus, as the Court has read the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges, logic
dictates that the same analysis will apply the prohibition against gender discrimination to
all parties. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (prohibiting a criminal de-
fendant from exercising race-based peremptory challenges); Edmonson v. Leesville Con-
crete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (prohibiting a civil litigant from exercising race-based
peremptory challenges); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that a criminal de-
fendant has standing to object to race-based peremptory challenges without showing that
the defendant and the excluded juror share the same race), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 366
(1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a prosecutor may not exercise
race-based peremptory challenges).
165. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425. The Court concluded that discrimination on the basis of
gender violates the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly where, "the dis-
crimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes."
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otherwise, 66 J.E.B. signals the Court's willingness to sacrifice the effec-
tiveness of the peremptory challenge in order to eliminate invidious dis-
crimination in the jury selection process.
A. The Majority Opinion: Extending Batson to Prohibit Gender-Based
Peremptory Challenges
The J.E.B. Court began its decision by reviewing the heightened scru-
tiny analysis constitutionally accorded to gender-based classifications.167
This standard, the Court reasoned, protects against governmental policies
that reflect archaic and overbroad generalizations based on outdated ste-
reotypes about men and women that have resulted in historic discrimina-
tion.168 For gender-based discrimination to pass constitutional muster, a
state must show that the discrimination substantially furthers the state's
legitimate interest 169 in promoting a fair and impartial trial. 7 '
It. at 1422. In tracing the chronology of gender discrimination in jury selection, Justice
Blackmun found that women and African-Americans shared a history of total exclusion
warranting the protection that Batson affords. Id. at 1425; see also Note, Beyond Batson:
Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1920, 1921 (1992)
(arguing that, notwithstanding the differences between them, the shared history of women
and African-Americans warrants applying Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges)
[hereinafter Beyond Batson].
166. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98-99. Throughout Batson and its progeny, the Court specifi-
cally has affirmed its belief that the decisions do not detract from the value of the peremp-
tory challenge. Thus, the Court in Batson emphasized that "we do not agree that our
decision today will undermine the contribution the [peremptory] challenge generally
makes to the administration of justice." Id. In McCollum, the Court reiterated, "[w]e do
not believe that this decision will undermine the contribution of the peremptory challenge
to the administration of justice." McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358. In J.E.B., the Court com-
mented that the "conclusion that litigants may not strike potential jurors solely on the basis
of gender does not imply the elimination of all peremptory challenges." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct.
at 1429.
167. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425; see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,200 (1976) (holding that
an Oklahoma statute which prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to men under the age of 21
and women under 18 was not substantially related to the achievement of an important
government function and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause); see supra, note 35
(discussing the heightened scrutiny analysis applied to gender-based classifications).
168. J.E.B., 114 S .Ct. at 1424; see Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99; Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498, 506-07 (1975).
169. Gender-based classifications require " 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' " to
survive judicial scrutiny, and the classification must be substantially related to achieving an
important governmental end. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425; see Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) (holding that a state-funded, single-sex university violated
equal protection because the gender-based classification was not closely related to impor-
tant governmental objectives); Personnel Adm'r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273
(1979) (stating that gender "classifications must bear a close and substantial relationship to
important governmental objectives") (citations omitted).
170. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425. The Court found that the interest in a fair and impartial
jury is the only legitimate interest the State possibly could have, because no other interest
1995]
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The State of Alabama argued that its exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude males was legitimate because men on the jury would be
more sympathetic to the petitioner, a male alleged to be the father of a
non-marital child. 171 The Court summarily rejected this argument as "the
very stereotype the law condemns."' 72 The Court viewed the respon-
dent's arguments as reminiscent of the notions advanced to justify the
total exclusion of women from juries.
173
The majority recognized that the Batson decision protected several in-
terests. 174 The J.E.B. Court found this to be equally true where gender
discrimination in jury selection is implicated.' 75 The Court found that
individual litigants, whether the state, a criminal defendant, or a party to
a civil action, are harmed by the risk that gender prejudice will infect the
entire proceeding.176 In addition, the community as a whole is harmed
because the state will be perceived as participating in invidious discrimi-
nation, inevitably undermining confidence in the judicial system.177 The
is substantially related to the discrimination in question. Id. at 1426 n.8. In so holding, the
Court rejected the State's argument that gender-based peremptory challenges should be
permitted in this particular case because it is a paternity action. Id. Illegitimate children,
the State asserted, are "victims of historical discrimination and entitled to heightened scru-
tiny under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. Therefore, gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges would further the State's interest in protecting the illegitimate child. Id.
171. Id. at 1426.
172. Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). The Court dismissed the
State's contention that its decision to strike the male jurors was based on the perception
that men would be more sympathetic to the putative father, finding it untenable that gen-
der alone is an accurate predictor of a juror's attitudes. Id. at 1426-27. The Court gave
little regard to a study cited by the State in which the authors concluded that in rape cases
female jurors are more likely to convict than male jurors. Id. at 1426 n.9 (quoting REID
HASTIE ET AL, INSIDE THE JURY 140 (1983)). The majority of studies, the Court found,
suggest that there is no appreciable difference in the attitudes of male and female jurors.
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426 n.9; see VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY
76 (1986); 1 FRANCIS X. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS § 143, at 207 (1949).
The Court emphasized that the existence of statistical support does not, alone, justify gen-
der discrimination that otherwise violates the Equal Protection Clause. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct.
at 1427 n.il.
173. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426.
174. Id. at 1427; see Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2353-54 (1992); Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414
(1990) (discussing the harm that race-based peremptory challenges inflict), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 366 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). Justice Thomas, in his con-
currence in Edmonson, maintained that the Court's emphasis on the "multiple ends" of
Batson has exalted the rights of the excluded juror above the rights of criminal defendants.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2361 (Thomas, J., concurring).
175. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427; see infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text (applying
Batson's multiple ends to gender).
176. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427.
177. Id. Justice Blackmun argued that "[t]he community is harmed by the State's par-
ticipation in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of con-
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Court found that permitting the proliferation of gender-based stereotypes
would invite cynicism regarding the jury's objectivity.178 Court-sanc-
tioned gender discrimination also risks creating the impression that the
judicial system denies full participation in jury service to otherwise quali-
fied citizens.
179
Furthermore, the Court noted that excluded jurors are personally in-
jured when they are the subject of gender-motivated discrimination in the
exercise of peremptory challenges.' ° Notwithstanding the fact that wo-
men do not constitute a numerical minority, and that women, as a group,
are likely to be represented on the jury even if all peremptory challenges
are exercised discriminatorily, the harm to each excluded individual juror
remains.' 8 ' In describing this individual harm, the Court noted that each
individual maintains a right not to be excluded from a jury on the basis of
impermissible gender-based stereotypes. 182  Justice Blackmun empha-
sized that this decision does not proscribe the effective use of the peremp-
tory challenge. 183 He noted that while gender may not serve as the sole
motivation for a peremptory challenge, a party may still remove any
group normally afforded rational basis review from the panel. 184  More-
fidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom
engenders." Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. Justice Blackmun wrote that this is of particular concern where the case in-
volves gender related issues such as rape, sexual harassment, or paternity. Id.
180. Id. The Court argued that it makes no difference when the discrimination is di-
rected at males, who historically have not been subjected to gender discrimination, because
the Fourteenth Amendment protects males and females equally from intentional gender-
based discrimination by state actors. Id. at 1428; see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (holding that a state university's policy that discriminated
against males rather than females is subject to heightened scrutiny as a gender-based classi-
fication); cf. Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose
Right is it, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725, 726-27 (1992) (arguing that the primary
injury inflicted by racial discrimination in jury selection is to the excluded juror, and the
primary reason for prohibiting such discrimination is to provide all citizens with equal op-
portunities to participate in the institutions of American self-government).
181. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428 n.13. The Court commented that "[t]he exclusion of even
one juror for impermissible reasons harms that juror and undermines public confidence in
the fairness of the system." Id.
182. Id. at 1428.
183. Id. at 1429. Justice Blackmun rebutted the argument that all peremptory chal-
lenges are based on a stereotype or bias of some kind by noting that, while this may be
true, it is only where they reinforce the same stereotypes that were used to exclude persons
from voting, jury service, and other protected activities that the Equal Protection Clause is
violated. Id. at 1428 n.14.
184. Id. at 1429. A statute will survive rational basis review if the classification at issue
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. NOWAK & ROTUNDA supra note 35, at
574-75; see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(holding a Texas city ordinance that discriminated against the mentally retarded violative
1995]
Catholic University Law Review
over, a party may even strike persons based on characteristics that are
generally associated with one gender, so long as the reason for the strike
is the associated characteristic and not gender itself.
185
The rule is essentially the same as in Batson: the party objecting to the
strikes must establish a prima facie case of intentional gender discrimina-
tion, after which the party exercising the peremptory challenge must ar-
ticulate a gender-neutral reason for the strike. 186 The J.E.B. Court
reiterated the position it took in Batson, namely that the race or gender-
neutral explanation need not rise to the level necessary to support a chal-
lenge for cause, but must merely demonstrate that the strike was moti-
vated by something other than race or gender.187 To rule otherwise, the
Court concluded, would depart from the spirit of the Equal Protection
Clause and deny the opportunity for participation in the fair administra-
tion of justice.'88
B. The Concurring Opinions
Justice O'Connor, in concurrence, recognized that while eliminating
gender discrimination in jury selection is important, the majority's hold-
ing would further burden courts and unreasonably constrain experienced
litigators from relying on intuition. 189 As objections to the use of per-
emptory challenges increase, Justice O'Connor argued, judicial time and
resources will be diverted from the merits of the case to the jury selection
of the Equal Protection Clause because it was not rationally related to a governmental
objective). Examples of classifications which merit only rational basis review are general
economic or social welfare classifications, that do not burden a class the Court has deter-
mined is entitled to a higher standard of protection, such as race or gender. Id. at 440-41.
185. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429. The Court noted that it would be permissible to strike
all members of the jury with military experience, even though the strike would affect men
disproportionately, because the number of men with military experience far exceeds the
number of women. Id. at 1429 n.16.
186. Id. at 1429-30. In Powers, the Supreme Court modified the rule in Batson by elim-
inating the requirement that the litigant prove that he is a member of a cognizable racial
group and that the prosecutor struck jurors of the defendant's race. Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400, 416 (1990), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 366 (1994); cf supra notes 71-80 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the test for determining if a peremptory challenge is impermissibly
race-motivated). Applying this principle to the Court's decision in J.E.B., a male litigant
could object to the exclusion of female jurors and vice versa.
187. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986). The
Court in Batson stressed that although the requirement limits the traditional nature of the
peremptory challenge, the prosecutor's explanation need not equal a challenge for cause.
Id.
188. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430. Justice Blackmun attested that the decision in J.E.B.
enforces the Constitutional guarantee that all citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gen-
der, have the opportunity to participate in democracy. Id.
189. Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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process. 190 In addition, Justice O'Connor contended, the peremptory
challenge is an important tool to help litigators select the most impartial
and unbiased jury possible.' 9' Peremptory challenges require an attorney
to use her intuition to evaluate a juror's sympathies.' 92 Developed
through experience and educated guesses, this intuition is often impossi-
ble to articulate. 93 As more restraints are imposed, Justice O'Connor
argued, peremptory challenges increasingly resemble challenges for
cause.
194
Justice Kennedy also concurred in the judgment, finding that stare de-
cisis compelled the Court's decision.' 95 Prior cases, he noted, prohibited
190. Id. Justice O'Connor wrote, "[i]n further constitutionalizing jury selection proce-
dures, the Court increases the number of cases in which jury selection-once a sideshow-
will become part of the main event." Id. In expressing her concerns over the additional
litigation this issue will initiate, Justice O'Connor noted that Batson mini-hearings are
common and because women constitute a larger proportion of potential jurors than Afri-
can-Americans, a greater amount of litigation over this issue can be expected. Id.
191. Id. Justice O'Connor observed that " '[pleremptory challenges, by enabling each
side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most partial toward the other side, are a
means of eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both sides, thereby assuring the selection
of a qualified and unbiased jury.' " Id. (quoting Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484
(1990)). Justice O'Connor argued that if the peremptory challenge were not of significant
value, it would not have endured from the thirteenth century to the present. Id.
192. Id. Justice O'Connor asserted that an experienced trial attorney could recognize
potential bias in jurors without being able to justify it sufficiently to satisfy a challenge for
cause. Id. For a criticism of the "intuitive" approach to exercising peremptory challenges,
see Swift, supra note 9, at 362-63 (advocating a complete ban on intuitive challenges be-
cause the decision is not reviewable by trial courts).
193. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431. Expressing confidence in an attorney's intuition Justice
O'Connor asserted that "[o]ur belief that experienced lawyers will often correctly intuit
which jurors are likely to be the least sympathetic, and our understanding that the lawyer
will often be unable to explain the intuition, are the very reason we cherish the peremptory
challenge." Id.
194. Id. In addition, Justice O'Connor advocated limiting the Court's decision to chal-
lenges exercised by the state. Id. The private litigant and the criminal defendant are not
state actors and as such should not be bound by the same restraints that prohibit the states
from discriminating. Id. at 1432. In her opinion, the holding in J.E.B. should be limited to
its facts, where the state acts to discriminate based on gender; rather than encompass the
decisions of Powers and McCollum which hold that, for purposes of jury selection, a pri-
vate party is a state actor. Id. at 1433.
195. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy traced the evolution of precedents
directing the majority to its conclusion. Id. First, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880), declared that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from enacting laws ban-
ning African-Americans from jury service. Id.; see supra note 49 (discussing the Court's
conclusion in Strauder). Next, Craig v. Boren held that gender-based classifications are
presumptively invalid and are subject to heightened scrutiny. 429 U.S. 190, 204-05 (1976);
see supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the heightened scrutiny analysis as
applied to gender-based classifications). Finally, Duren v. Missouri held that discrimina-
tion in jury selection that results in under-representation of women is impermissible. 439
U.S. 357, 360 (1979).
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gender discrimination in jury selection generally.196 This precedent, ac-
cording to Justice Kennedy, requires refining the analysis to prohibit gen-
der discriminatory peremptory challenges specifically. 197 Jurors, he
continued, are called to decide a case as representatives of the commu-
nity, not on the basis of their gender.198 Justice Kennedy concluded that
the judicial system should condemn discrimination in jury selection just as
it condemns jurors who decide factual issues according to their individual
prejudices.1 99
C. The Dissent: Finding Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges
Acceptable as a Matter of Biology and Policy
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that significant distinctions
between race and gender warrant not extending Batson to prohibit gen-
der-based peremptory challenges.2"' That Equal Protection jurispru-
dence accords these classifications different levels of scrutiny is clear
evidence of a distinction.2 1 Further, differences in the biologies and ex-
periences of the two genders necessitate a realization that gender differ-
ences may affect the jury's decision.20 2
Justice Scalia, also dissenting,20 3 noted that the petitioner used all but
one of his peremptory challenges to remove women from the jury.2"
Applying the majority's reasoning, then, the petitioner inflicted injury
196. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1433-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 1434. Justice Kennedy argued that the Equal Protection Clause is predicated
on the belief of individual rights. Id. The injury to the excluded juror is the same whether
he impermissibly has been excluded from jury service because of a law banning his gender
or because a litigant has used a peremptory challenge to strike him because of his gender.
Id.
198. Id. Justice Kennedy stressed that "[n]othing would be more pernicious to the jury
system than for society to presume that persons of different backgrounds go to the jury
room to voice prejudice." Id.
199. Id. (suggesting that a juror who is guided by his prejudice when deciding a case
abandons his oath).
200. Id. at 1434-35 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 1435. In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that gender classifications
do not warrant as strict a judicial standard as racial classifications because the population
in our society is almost evenly divided between the genders. Id
202. Id. In Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, this factor could establish the required
showing that gender discrimination substantially furthers the state's legitimate interest in
securing a fair trial. Id.
203. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 1436-37. Justice Scalia argued that, insofar as the petitioner was just as guilty
as the respondent of using peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, the Court's
decision "illustrates why making restitution to Paul when it is Peter who has been robbed is
such a bad idea." Id. at 1437. He also argued that any error in the striking of jurors
certainly was harmless as the scientific evidence presented at trial established that the peti-
tioner was the father of the child with 99.92 percent accuracy. Id.
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upon the excluded female jurors.2"5 Justice Scalia, however, found this
acceptable because both men and women are equally subject to a per-
emptory strike, and thus neither group is denied equal protection.2 °6 The
strikes in this case only indicated each party's attempt to assemble a jury
that would be most favorably disposed to its case.207
III. STRIKING THE BALANCE
A. The Incompatible Goals of an Impartial Jury and the Elimination
of Gender Discrimination in Jury Selection
In J.E.B., the Court was compelled to weigh the competing interests
involved when discrimination is alleged in the exercise of peremptory
challenges. 2 8 In striking this balance, the Court weighed a litigant's in-
terest in securing an impartial jury209 against society's interest in the elim-
ination of invidious discrimination in the jury selection process. 210 The
Court reasoned that the harm caused by gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges outweighs the interest in an impartial jury.21' Thus, the Court im-
pliedly ruled that it is willing to sacrifice the traditional view of an
205. Id. at 1437.
206. Id. Justice Scalia argued that it would be unacceptable if both parties systemati-
cally struck jurors of a certain group, "so that the strikes evinced group-based animus and
served as a proxy for segregated venire lists." Id.
207. Id. Justice Scalia, agreeing with Justice O'Connor, expressed his concerns that the
majority's decision will initiate extensive collateral litigation in the jury selection process
especially in criminal cases, where a defendant is not concerned with efficiency or cost. Id.
at 1439.
208. Id. at 1425.
209. Id. at 1425-26. The majority commented that the state has a legitimate interest in
employing peremptory challenges to ensure a fair and impartial jury. Id. at 1429; see supra
notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing the right to a jury trial).
210. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425-26; cf Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986)
(holding that "[tihe core guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that their State
will not discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were we to approve the
exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions [stereotypes], which arise solely from
the jurors' race").
211. In his concurrence in Georgia v. McCollum, Justice Thomas maintained that the
Court's decision signaled its willingness to sacrifice the rights of a criminal defendant to
protect the rights of a juror. 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). In
McCollum, the Court refused to permit a criminal defendant from exercising race-based
peremptory challenges in a racially charged trial. Id. at 2359. In Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Company, the Court ruled that a civil litigant may not discriminate in the exercise
of peremptory challenges in selecting the jury that will try his case. 500 U.S. 614, 630
(1991).
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impartial jury rather than allow discrimination to persist in the
courtroom.
2 12
Although the unfettered discretion afforded by peremptory challenges
does present the opportunity to discriminate, 213 the peremptory chal-
lenge nonetheless is an effective means of securing an impartial jury. As
Justice O'Connor observed in her concurrence in J.E.B., peremptory
challenges allow each party to strike those jurors they believe are least
partial to their case, thereby eliminating the extremes of partiality on
each side.214 The result is the most impartial and unbiased jury
possible.
2 15
Competing with the interest of achieving an impartial jury is the goal of
eliminating state-sanctioned discrimination in jury selection and the
Court's dedication to protecting the rights of the excluded juror.2 16 Gen-
der discrimination in the selection of juries denies the excluded juror the
opportunity to participate in the administration of justice.217 It also sub-
jects the excluded juror to the public humiliation of having been denied
this opportunity.2 8 Because, by nature, peremptory challenges are exer-
212. Of course, where there are concrete reasons for concluding that jurors' prejudices
will interfere with their ability to decide the issue impartially, the juror will be subject to a
challenge for cause. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
213. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). For a
discussion of some of the more prominent cases in which peremptory challenges have been
used to eliminate racial groups from the petit jury, see VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 155-56.
214. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Holland v. Illinois,
493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990)). Ideally, peremptory challenges should be exercised with the
goal of seating an impartial jury, they should not be used by a party "to shape a jury to
ensure a favorable decision." Dave Harbeck, Comment, Eliminating Unconstitutional Ju-
ries: Applying United States v. De Gross to All Heightened Scrutiny Equal Protection
Groups in the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 77 MINN. L. REV. 689, 716 (1993). But
see Beyond Batson, supra note 165, at 1931-32 (arguing that gender-based peremptory
challenges do not further the interest of jury impartiality).
215. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
216. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (stating that the elimination of dis-
crimination in jury selection invokes the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution); see Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 (holding that racial discrimination
in the exercise of peremptory challenges violates the Fourteenth Amendment); see also
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975).
217. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430. Given the Court's unwavering adherence to the princi-
ple drawn from Batson, it clearly is axiomatic that a juror has a right not to be excluded
from jury service because of certain traits, and is therefore injured when excluded based on
nothing more than race or gender. See id. at 1427; see also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct.
2348, 2353 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 600, 619 (1991); Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 366 (1994); Batson, 476 U.S. at 87;
Beyond Batson, supra note 165, at 1936 (arguing that "[blecause juries are supposed to
represent the conscience of the community, the exclusion of individuals based on gender
signals that the targeted gender does not belong to the political community").
218. Cf Powers, 499 U.S. at 413-14 (explaining that the injury stems from being ex-
cluded not because the person is incompetent to be a juror, but because a litigant has made
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cised within the walls of a courthouse,219 gender discrimination in this
context calls into question the fairness of not only the particular proceed-
ing, but also the judicial system as a whole.220
B. The Difficulty in Applying J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.
The lower courts, which have the task of implementing J.E.B. will have
even more difficulty eliminating gender-based strikes than they have had
in eliminating racially motivated strikes.22' Various federal circuit court
decisions have interpreted Batson to allow a challenge so long as it is not
"frivolous," 222 or to accept mere intuition as a valid race-neutral reason
for striking jurors.223 Courts also have interpreted Batson to require that
once the prosecutor articulates a race-neutral reason, the burden shifts
back to the opponent to show that the proffered race-neutral reasons are
the decision to exclude jurors based on their race). Justice Kennedy, writing for the major-
ity in Powers observed that, "[a] venireperson excluded from jury service because of race
suffers a profound personal humiliation heightened by its public character." Id.
219. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628. The discrimination is even more egregious in the
courtroom, according to Justice Kennedy, because of the role that the judicial system plays
in securing the rights of a free society. Id.
220. See id. (arguing that racial discrimination undermines the integrity of the judicial
system).
221. Adding to this confusion is the Supreme Court's recent decision in Purkett v.
Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995), where the Court accepted as race-neutral a prosecutor's
explanation that he struck two African-American jurors because they had long, unkempt
hair, moustaches, and beards. Id. at 1771. The Court stated Batson's requirement of artic-
ulating a race-neutral reason for the strike "does not demand an explanation that is persua-
sive, or even plausible." Id. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court strayed from
the standard established in Batson by "the surprising announcement that any neutral ex-
planation, no matter how 'implausible or fantastic,' even if it is 'silly or superstitious,' is
sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination." Id at 1774 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). Applying this holding to gender-based challenges, lower courts will be
required to accept implausible and unpersuasive explanations as gender-neutral. See infra
notes 222-25 and accompanying text (discussing the inconsistent application of the Batson
decision by federal court judges). The issue of gender discrimination will arise more often
than race discrimination because the population is almost equally divided among the gen-
ders whereas there is a great disparity in numbers between the races. See infra notes 226-
33 and accompanying text (discussing the increased probability that gender can be made an
issue in jury selection).
222. Jones v. Jones, 938 F.2d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1991), cited in Swift, supra note 9, at
360-61 (discussing various lower court interpretations of Batson).
223. United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1489 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 863
(1990); United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1988), cited in Swift,
supra note 9, at 359. According to Batson, however, mere intuition is not sufficient to
satisfy the requirement that an attorney articulate a neutral reason for striking a juror.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.20 (1986). A prosecutor's explanation must be
"clear and reasonably specific" and reveal "legitimate reasons" for the challenge. Id.
(quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)).
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pretextual.224 These interpretations are not consistent with each other,
nor are they consistent with Batson.225
It is difficult to conceive of a case where a party could not argue that
the opposing party exercised a peremptory challenge based on a gender
stereotype prohibited by J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB. Women and men
constitute nearly equal percentages of the population, and, as such, the
chances are much greater that when an attorney strikes a juror, gender, as
opposed to race, can be made an issue.226 Whenever an attorney strikes a
juror where gender conceivably is an issue, she risks being forced to artic-
ulate the reasons for doing so.227 As Justice O'Connor argued in her
J.E.B. concurrence, attacks on an attorney's strikes transform the jury
selection process from what was once a small part of the trial to the main
event.228 Litigation, generated by allegations of discriminatory jury selec-
tion, will be especially frequent in criminal cases where most defendants
have little concern for the conservation of time or cost.229 Good inten-
tions aside, J.E.B. will result in additional burdens on the already de-
pleted and overburdened courts.23 ° In addition, courts will experience
great difficulty in deciding whether the proffered reason is an unaccept-
able gender-based strike.231 The J.E.B. Court did note that the decision
224. Jones, 938 F.2d at 844.
225. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text (discussing the test formulated in
Batson).
226. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct at 1434-35 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
227. Commentators have suggested that Batson's requirement that an attorney articu-
late race-neutral reasons to counter an attack on her exercise of peremptory challenges is
nothing more than an exercise in creativity. Swift, supra note 9, at 362; see Forman, supra
note 145, at 59. To eliminate gender discrimination in jury selection, Forman proposes a
system of proportional representation. Id. at 75. As the genders comprise a relatively
equal percent of the population, this would result in juries that were made up of an equal
number of women and men. Id. Swift argues that only prohibiting all strikes based on
subjective and unverifiable data will eliminate the discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges. Swift, supra note 9, at 362-63. These "soft data" reasons for excluding jurors, such
as body language, speech, or intuition of the attorney, are impossible for a judge to analyze
effectively. Id. "Hard data" reasons, on the other hand, such as employment or level of
education, would be permissible if substantially related to the facts of the case. Id. at 363-
64. Arguably, all attorneys can easily conjure up a race-neutral reason for a peremptory
challenge sufficient to survive a Batson attack. Forman, supra note 145, at 59; Swift, supra
note 9, at 362. Presumably, it would be just as simple for an attorney to articulate a gen-
der-neutral reason for striking a juror when required to do so.
228. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
230. See Guinee, supra note 9, at 845 (arguing that the application of Batson to gender-
based peremptory challenges will lengthen voir dire because almost all strikes may be chal-
lenged as gender-based, undoubtedly protracting the already slow litigation process).
231. Cf Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing
that while a prosecutor could easily assert facially neutral reasons for challenging a juror,
courts are ill-equipped to evaluate those reasons); cf. Swift, supra note 9, at 362 (noting
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still allows parties to strike jurors where the basis for the strike is a char-
acteristic that is disproportionately associated with one gender.232 Ex-
actly how disproportionate the association must be or whether a certain
association is per se impermissible remains unclear.233
Courts will be faced with the task of deciphering which strikes are legit-
imate exercises of peremptory challenges and which are impermissible.234
Courts will have to balance the interest in obtaining an impartial jury
against the excluded juror's interest in participating in the administration
of justice.235 Regardless of the final resolution, however, litigators will
that peremptory challenges based on subjective reasons can mask both overt and covert
discrimination). Swift advocated eliminating all peremptory challenges that are not based
on objective data because it is impossible for courts to effectively evaluate whether an
attorney's intuitive reason is legitimate. Swift, supra note 9, at 361-62.
232. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct at 1429. For example, while military service disproportionately is
associated with men, it would be permissible for an attorney to strike all persons from the
jury who had served in the military. Id. at 1429 n.16. In a recent case, however, the Court
of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, applying J. E.B., affirmed a lower court's decision which
found that a prosecutor's proffered reason for excluding three male jurors was impermissi-
bly gender-based. Allen v. State, No. CR 92-1463, 1994 WL 575991 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct.
21, 1994). The prosecutor argued that he struck three jurors because their occupations
might have given them special knowledge of gear shifts in tractors. Id at *1. The court
found that the occupations (truck driver, mechanic, and construction company employee)
were male-dominated and resulted in de facto discrimination. Id. The lower court found
that "in making a decision to strike these occupations, the State also made a decision to
strike males." Id.
233. For example, in the prosecution of a defendant for rape, it would seem at first
glance that a defense attorney using peremptory challenges to strike all persons from the
jury who had previously been the victim of sexual assault would be permissible. Although
the challenge is not based on any gender stereotype, it almost certainly will result in the
removal of only female jurors. In a recent case where the prosecution objected to the
defense's use of peremptory challenges to strike females from the jury, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, ruled that the defense attorney's explanation that he
had struck jurors on the basis of their status as crime victims was not pretextual. People v.
Dixon, 615 N.Y.S. 2d 904, 909 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The court found that there "is a
rational basis for the suspicion that a crime victim might be less sympathetic to an accused
criminal than would a person who has never been victimized by crime." Id. Likewise, it
would seem that there is a rational basis for concluding that female jurors would be more
sympathetic than male jurors to a plaintiff suing the manufacturer of breast implants for
causing cancer. This could motivate a defense attorney to exercise peremptory challenges
against female jurors to eliminate any possibility of bias in favor of the plaintiff. The ra-
tionale for the strikes would not be based on gender stereotypes, although the result would
be the same, the elimination of jurors because of their gender.
234. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text (arguing that courts will have diffi-
culty in evaluating the legitimacy of gender-based strikes).
235. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425-26. For gender-based strikes to survive heightened scru-
tiny, the discrimination must substantially further the State's interest in achieving a fair and
impartial trial. Id. at 1425. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, the Court found
that, regardless of the parties or causes involved in the action, the sole purpose of the
peremptory challenge is to assist in the selection of a fair and impartial jury. 500 U.S. 614,
620 (1991).
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have lost the ability to participate in selecting the least partial jury to
judge their client. Moreover, litigants who are prohibited from striking
jurors and consequently believe them to be partial, will lose some mea-
sure of respect for the jury's verdict and the justice system as a whole.236
C. Beyond J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Future Restrictions on the
Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
Despite the Court's assurances to the contrary,237 the J.E.B. holding
clearly diminishes the value of the peremptory challenge. What remains
uncertain, however, is exactly how the courts will further restrict their
use. Beginning with Batson and continuing through J.E.B., the Supreme
Court has articulated a rule of law mandating that peremptory challenges
not be a vehicle for perpetuating invidious discrimination based on im-
238 hipermissible stereotypes. Under this approach, the same standard must
be applied to prohibit the exclusion of other classes of jurors who have
been subjected to unlawful discrimination based on group stereotypes.
239
As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in J.E.B., "we can expect to learn
from the Court's peremptory/stereotyping jurisprudence in the future
which stereotypes the Constitution frowns upon and which it does
not. "240
If the Court's holding is carried to its logical conclusion, the exercise of
peremptory challenges should be prohibited whenever the characteristic
upon which the strike is based is one that has been afforded heightened
scrutiny.241 Examples of such characteristics include religious affilia-
236. See Forman, supra note 145, at 67 (discussing the importance of peremptory chal-
lenges in allowing litigants to have some input as to the make-up of the jury that will
decide their fate). In J.E.B., Justice Scalia argued that if peremptory challenges give liti-
gants a greater belief in jury impartiality, the challenges are worthwhile because "the ap-
pearance of justice is as important as its reality." Id. at 1438 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's assertions that
the effectiveness of the peremptory challenge has not been curtailed).
238. See Batson 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986); Powers v. Ohio 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991); Ed-
monson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.
Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992); J.E.B. 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
239. In his dissent in Batson, Chief Justice Burger argued that conventional equal pro-
tection principles dictate that Batson's prohibition of race-based peremptory challenges
apply to gender, age, religious or political affiliation, mental capacity, number of children,
living arrangements, and employment in a particular industry or profession. Batson, 476
U.S. at 124 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Batson).
240. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text (discussing the heightened scrutiny
analysis applied in J.E.B.). The harm to the parties, to the excluded juror, and to the
community as a whole are the same when a person is excluded from the jury based on any
characteristic which is accorded heightened scrutiny, not just gender. Harbeck, supra note
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tion24 2 and illegitimacy.243 In previous cases, the Court has found a Con-
stitutional violation where a state discriminates against persons on the
basis of either of these characteristics.244 It is not difficult to envision
cases where an attorney would rationally conclude that a member of a
214, at 713; see supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text (discussing the harms inflicted
when a juror is improperly excluded on the basis of gender).
242. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny to in-
validate a Minnesota statute that imposed registration and reporting requirements upon
religious organizations soliciting more than 50% of their funds from nonmembers). Re-
cently, however, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct.
2120 (1994). In Davis, after the petitioner objected to the prosecutor's strike of an Afri-
can-American juror, the prosecutor asserted that she struck the juror on the grounds that
he was a Jehovah's Witness, and in her experience persons of that faith were reluctant to
exercise authority over fellow men. Id. at 2121 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certi-
orari). Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the denial of certiorari,
arguing that the principles of J.E.B. compel prohibiting the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges based on religious affiliation. Id. He argued that:
In breaking the barrier between classifications that merit strict equal protection
scrutiny and those that receive what we have termed "heightened" or "intermedi-
ate" scrutiny, J.E.B. would seem to have extended Batson's equal protection
analysis to all strikes based on the latter category of classifications-a category
which presumably would include classifications based on religion.
Id. (citations omitted).
Recently, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas has extended the rule in
Batson to prohibit religious-based peremptory challenges. Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93,
1994 WL 695868 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994). In Casarez, the defendant, charged with
aggravated sexual assault, objected on Batson grounds to the prosecutor's use of peremp-
tory challenges against two African-Americans. Id. at *1. The State responded that it had
not struck the jurors on the basis of race, but because of their Pentecostal religion. Id. The
defendant objected again arguing that the challenge based on religion violated the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. The trial court overruled the objection and the defendant appealed.
Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals relied on state court decisions and decisions of the
United States Supreme Court including Larson v. Valente to conclude that classifications
based on religion are afforded heightened scrutiny. Id. at *8. The Court reversed the
conviction finding that the same reasons for prohibiting race-based peremptory challenges
in Batson and gender-based challenges in J.E.B. apply to peremptory challenges based on
religion. Id. at *10.
243. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (holding that a Pennsylvania statute
that set a six-year statute of limitations for paternity actions did not withstand heightened
scrutiny and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265
(1978) (holding that a New York statute requiring a judicial finding of paternity to permit
an illegitimate child to inherit through intestate succession was substantially related to an
important state interest). The Court repeatedly has applied heightened scrutiny analysis
when considering a classification based on illegitimacy. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265; City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
244. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 246-47 (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a Minnesota
statute that imposed registration and reporting requirements upon religious organizations
that solicit more than 50% of their funds from nonmembers); Clark, 486 U.S. at 463-65
(holding that a Pennsylvania statute which set a six-year statute of limitations for paternity
actions did not withstand heightened scrutiny and, thus denied illegitimate children equal
protection as mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment).
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certain religious group or a person who was born out of wedlock would
be more sympathetic to the opposing party. This could precipitate the
exercise of a peremptory challenge absent the requisite "challenge for
cause" foundation. These areas are likely to be the next logical expan-
sions of the Batson/J.E.B. principle, but how far the Court will extend
this line of cases in the interests of eliminating invidious discrimination is,
as yet, unknown.
IV. CONCLUSION
In J.E.B., the Supreme Court ruled that the interest in eliminating gen-
der discrimination from the courtroom outweighs the traditional view of
the unfettered peremptory challenge. The analysis that the Court em-
ployed to prohibit race-based peremptory challenges applies equally to
other classifications where the Court has condemned historic discrimina-
tion. As the Court continues to expand upon the Batson line of cases,
there will remain fewer instances where an attorney can legitimately ex-
ercise a peremptory challenge. Although the Court might never actually
eliminate the peremptory challenge altogether, continued expansion of
the Batson principles eventually could render peremptory challenges un-
availing in most circumstances.
Peter Michael Collins
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